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NOTES
FRONT PAY: A NECESSARY ALTERNATIVE TO
REINSTATEMENT UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
INTRODUCTION
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act' (ADEA or Act) prohib-
its employers from discharging or refusing to hire any individual because
of age,2 or from using age as a basis for taking any action that adversely
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982). The ADEA was enacted in 1967 after a report to
Congress by the Secretary of Labor recommended the implementation of a "national
policy with respect to hiring on the basis of ability rather than age." 113 Cong. Rec. 7076
(1967) (statement of Sen. Javits) (quoting U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Older American
Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment (1965)). This report had been mandated by
§ 715 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1970), amended
by § 2000e-14 (1976). See infra note 28 and accompanying text. President Johnson's
recommendation that Congress pass a law prohibiting age discrimination in employment
also contributed to the passage of the Act. Malin, Employment Discrimination: The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act-Protections, Prohibitions and Exceptions, in 1 Age
Discrimination § 16.01, at 16-41 (H. Eglit ed. 1984); see Special Message to the Congress
Proposing Programs for Older Americans, 1 Pub. Papers 32, 37-38 (1967).
The Act originally protected workers between the ages of 40 and 65. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 631 (1976), amended by 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982). The 1978 amendments extended
coverage to persons at least 40 years old but less than 70. Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982)); see Kodish v. United Air Lines, 463 F. Supp. 1245, 1249 (D.
Colo. 1979), affid, 628 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1980); ABA Division of Communications,
Your Rights Over Age 50, at 9 (1981). There is no upper age limit for federal employees
except those in certain occupations. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 631(b), 633a (1982); 1 Federal Reg-
ulation of Employment Service § 5:1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as FRES]; B. Schlei & P.
Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 482 & n.6 (2d ed. 1983). Legislation has
been introduced to remove the upper age limit of 70 for all workers. See H.R. 6233, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., 130 Cong. Rec. E3793 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Young); H. Sheppard & S. Rix, The Graying of Working America 167 (1977).
The Act was amended in 1984 to extend protection to American citizens who are em-
ployed in foreign countries by American companies. See Older Americans Act Amend-
ments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, § 802(a)(b), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (98
Stat.) 1767, 1792 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 632(0); see 130 Cong. Rec. S 11,864 (daily
ed. Sept. 26, 1984) (Conference Committee Agreement amending the ADEA); 130 Cong.
Rec. H9805 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984) (same).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); see Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 53 U.S.LW. 4024,
4026 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1985); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 232 (1983); Lorillard, Inc., v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 977 (9th
Cir. 1981); McConnell, Age Discrimination in Employment, in Policy Issues in Work and
Retirement 159, 190 (H. Parnes ed. 1983); M. Doering, S. Rhodes & M. Schuster, The
Aging Worker 16 (1983) [hereinafter cited as M. Doering].
The prohibitions in the Act originally applied only to private employers. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(b) (1970), amended by 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982). The 1974 amendments, how-
ever, extended its coverage to state and local governments, Fair Labor Standards Act
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 55, 74 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982)), and the federal government, id. § 28(b)(2), 88
Stat. at 74-75 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1982)); see Malin, supra note 1,
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affects any individual's status as an employee. The Act's purposes are
"to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather
§ 16.11 (state governments); id. § 16.12 (federal government). The constitutionality of
the extension to state employees was upheld in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243
(1983). See Note, EEOC v. Wyoming and Application of the ADEA to State and Local
Governments, 1983 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 303, 304 (1984).
The Act also provides several exceptions to its prohibitions. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0
(1982). For example, an employer may take any action otherwise prohibited if "age is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than
age." Id. § 623(0(1); see, e.g., Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561,
564-65 (8th Cir.) (age of test pilots not necessarily a bona fide occupational qualification
when plaintiff can demonstrate requisite physical capability), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966
(1977); Usery v. Tamiani Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 226 (5th Cir. 1976) (affirming
lower court's finding reasonably necessary company policy of refusing to consider appli-
cations of individuals between 40 and 65 for initial employment as intercity bus drivers).
See generally Comment, Age Discrimination in Employment-The Bona Fide Occupa-
tional Qualification Defense-Balancing the Interest of the Older Worker in Acquiring and
Continuing Employment Against the Interest in Public Safety, 24 Wayne L. Rev. 1339
(1978) (discussion of interpretations of Bona Fide Occupational Qualification exception
in ADEA).
Another exception arises when the employer "observe[s] the terms of. . .any bona
fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a
subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the Act], except that no such employee benefit plan
shall excuse the failure to hire any individual." 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1982). The 1978
amendments limited this exception by adding that "no such seniority system or employee
benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual ...
because of the age of such individual." Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amend-
ments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189, 189 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1982)). This provision thus prohibits employers from putting into
effect employee retirement plans that require retirement prior to age 70. 3 A. Larson &
L. Larson, Employment Discrimination § 101.1 l(a), at 21-154 (1984); see EEOC v. City
of Altoona, 723 F.2d 4, 7 (3d Cir. 1983) (eligibility for pension may not be a basis for
mandatory retirement), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2386 (1984).
A third exception permits retirement of an employee at 65 rather than 70 who "for the
2-year period immediately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide executive or a
high policymaking position" if the employee will receive on retirement pension benefits of
at least $44,000. 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1) (1982); see Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 567
F. Supp. 1320, 1323-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Chief Labor Counsel of Union Carbide held
not to be a bona fide executive), afid, 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984); J. Krauskopf, Advo-
cacy for the Aging § 11.2 (1983); 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra, § 101.12; Kandel,
Executive Exemption Under ADEA, 9 Employee Rel. L.J. 672, 676 (1984).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1982); see EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 232 & n.4
(1983); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 977 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1976)); Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 461 F. Supp. 362, 371
(D. Md. 1978), affid inpart, rev'd inpart on other grounds, 632 F.2d 1107 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert denied, 454 U.S. 825 (1981); see generally C. Edelman & I. Siegler, Federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Law 85-88 (1978) (discussion of ADEA's protections and
prohibitions); Malin, supra note 1, § 16.15 (same); O'Donnell, Lasser & Bailor, The Fed-
eral Age Discrimination Statute: Basic Law, Areas of Controversy, and Suggestions for
Compliance, 15 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1, 4 (1979) (same) [hereinafter cited as Basic Law].
The ADEA also prohibits discriminatory actions by employment agencies and labor
organizations. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(b)(c) (1982); Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Trans World
Airlines, 713 F.2d 940, 956 (2d Cir. 1983), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub
nom. Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 53 U.S.L.W. 4024 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1985); Brennan
v. Paragon Employment Agency, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 286, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), ar/'d
mem., 489 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1974); see generally 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note 2,
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than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and]
to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising
from the impact of age on employment."4 In order to enforce the
ADEA's prohibitions, Congress designed a two-part remedial scheme.
The first part is based on the enforcement mechanism of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA).5 The ADEA permits a plaintiff to utilize the
FLSA's administrative mechanism to recover back pay from the date of
the violation to the date of judgment.6 An ADEA plaintiff may also re-
cover liquidated damages equal to his back pay award,7 but only for will-
ful violations of the Act.8
In addition to this remedy, the ADEA provides a grant of other "legal
or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the
Act], including without limitation judgments compelling employment,
reinstatement or promotion."9 Whether this remedial scheme allows a
§§ 99.12-.13 (discussion of ADEA prohibitions applicable to employment agencies and
labor organizations); Malin, supra note 1, §§ 16.19-.21 (same).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982); see EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231 & n.3
(1983); Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 699 (1st Cir. 1983); Macellaro
v. Goldman, 643 F.2d 813, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Zinger v. Blanchette, 549
F.2d 901, 905 (3d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978); Gill v. Union Carbide
Corp., 368 F. Supp. 364, 367 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); ABA Division of Communications,
supra note 1, at 9; M. Doering, supra note 2, at 16; J. Krauskopf, supra note 2, § 11.1, at
223.
5. The enforcement mechanism of the FLSA is found at 29 U.S.C. §§ 211, 216-217
(1982). The ADEA incorporates this scheme at 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). See infra
notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982); see Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 579 & n.5
(1978); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727 (2d Cir. 1984); Davis v.
Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Prudential Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1231 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 53
U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985); Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, 579 F.2d 107, 109-10
(1st Cir. 1978); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Note, Punitive Damages Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 33
Hastings L.J. 457, 469 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Punitive Damages]. See infra notes 34,
56-61 and accompanying text.
The FLSA was amended in 1977 through the addition to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of lan-
guage very similar to the ADEA's grant of "legal and equitable relief" to protect workers
whose employers violate the FLSA's retaliatory discharge provision, 29 U.S.C
§ 215(a)(3) (1982). Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-151,
§ 10, 91 Stat. 1245, 1252 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 261(b) (1982)). See infra
note 69 for a discussion of the FLSA's retaliatory discharge provision. This amendment
should not alter the analysis of the ADEA's language and legislative history, see infra
notes 53-70, because "[a] statute of specific reference incorporates the provisions referred
to from the statute at the time of adoption without subsequent amendments." 2A C.
Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51.08, at 516 (4th ed. 1984). Thus, the
ADEA's incorporation of the FLSA's remedies should be analyzed through reference to
the FLSA as it existed in 1967. See Read, Is Referential Legislation Jorthwhile?, 25
Minn. L. Rev. 261, 271-72 (1941). In addition, cases interpreting the ADEA's incorpora-
tion of the FLSA remedies have not included discussion of this additional language added
to the FLSA. See infra notes 53, 55.
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plaintiff to recover "front pay" 1°-future damages in lieu of reinstate-
ment-has been disputed by the courts. 1 Some courts have held that
Congress did not intend this remedy to be a part of ADEA relief 2 or
that such an award would be overly speculative.' 3 Other courts, how-
ever, have allowed recovery of front pay on the ground that it is neces-
sary to make a plaintiff whole when reinstatement is not possible. 4
10. Front pay has been defined in various ways. See, e.g., Whittlesey v. Union Car-
bide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727 (2d Cir. 1984) ("damages for loss of future earnings");
Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984) ("prospective dam-
ages"); EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1231 (10th Cir.
1984) ("future damages in lieu of reinstatement"), vacated on other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W.
3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co. 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1167
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("damages for future loss of earnings"); 2 H. Eglit, Age Discrimination
§ 18.13, at 18-53 (1984) ("damages in lieu of reinstatement"); 3 A. Larson & L. Larson,
supra note 2, § 103.44, at 21-340 ("payment for wages that would have been earned sub-
sequent to trial but for the alleged discrimination"); see also Fadhl v. City and County of
San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 1984) (front pay defined in Title VII case);
Folz v. Marriott Corp., No. 82-0219 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 31, 1984) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (front pay described and awarded in ERISA case).
11. Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727 (2d Cir. 1984); Davis v.
Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Prudential Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1231 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 53
U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp.
1161, 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); 2 H. Eglit, supra note 10, § 18.13, at 18-53 to -54; 3 A.
Larson & L. Larson, supra note 2, § 103.44, at 21-340. Compare Kolb v. Goldring, Inc.,
694 F.2d 869, 874-75 n.4 (1st Cir. 1982) (denying front pay) and Wildman v. Lerner
Stores Corp., 582 F. Supp. 80, 83-84 (D.P.R. 1984) (same) with Whittlesey v. Union
Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728-29 (2d Cir. 1984) (granting front pay).
12. See, e.g., Kiel v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 575 F. Supp. 847, 849 (N.D. Ohio
1983); Grecco v. Spang & Co., 566 F. Supp. 413, 415 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Jaffee v. Plough
Broadcasting Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1194, 1195 (D. Md. 1979); Mader
v. Control Data Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1192, 1193-94 (D. Md. 1978);
Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
13. See, e.g., Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 582 F. Supp. 80, 83-84 (D.P.R. 1984);
Helwig v. Suburban Chevrolet, Inc., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1261, 1266-67 (D.
Md. 1983); Foit v. Suburban Bancorp., 549 F. Supp. 264, 267 (D. Md. 1982); Jaffee v.
Plough Broadcasting Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1194, 1195 (D. Md. 1979);
Mader v. Control Data Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1192, 1193-94 (D. Md.
1978); Covey v. Robert A. Johnston Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1188, 1192 (D.
Md. 1977); Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga.
1971).
14. E.g., Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727-28 (2d Cir. 1984);
Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Prudential
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds,
53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985); Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093,
1100-01 (8th Cir. 1982); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319-20
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 567 F.
Supp. 1320, 1330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984); Ventura v.
Federal Life Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp. 48, 50 (N.D. Il1. 1983); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison
Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Hoffman v. Nissan Motor Corp., 511
F. Supp. 352, 355-57 (D.N.H. 1981); see also O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp.,
Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1551-52 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (front pay may be awarded if on remand
"reinstatement is dismissed as a realistic alternative"). The Supreme Court vacated
EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 1984),
vacated on other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985), and remanded the case
to the Tenth Circuit for reconsideration consistent with the Court's opinion in Trans
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This Note argues that front pay should be awarded in appropriate cir-
cumstances. Part I examines ADEA remedies accepted in all jurisdic-
tions and concludes that such remedies are insufficient to make whole
certain workers who have been victims of discrimination. Part II ana-
lyzes the ADEA's language and legislative history and concludes that
they support an award of front pay in appropriate circumstances. Part
III examines the policy considerations involved, and Part IV discusses
various approaches to implementing front pay and suggests methods for
minimiz~ing the possibly speculative nature of the award.
I. REMEDIES UNDER THE ADEA
When Congress enacted the ADEA, it incorporated certain aspects of
the FLSA remedial scheme.1 5 The FLSA, which sets forth federal stan-
dards for minimum wages and overtime compensation, 6 defines the back
pay award recoverable by an injured employee as the amount unpaid
because of the employer's violation of FLSA minimum standards.' In
World Airlines v. Thurston, 53 U.S.L.W. 4024 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1985). See infra note 24 and
accompanying text. Because the issue in Thurston did not involve front pay, Prudential
remains valid precedent for the Tenth Circuit's view that front pay is an available remedy
under the ADEA.
Other courts have recognized that front pay may be appropriate, but have denied it in
particular cases for various reasons. See, eg., Ginsberg v. Burlington Indus. Inc., 500 F.
Supp. 696, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (front pay may be appropriate, but not in cases in which
plaintiff has not pursued reinstatement); Robb v. Chemetron Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1535, 1545 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (noted some authority for front pay, but other
damages and improved job position were sufficient to make plaintiffs whole); cf. Blim v.
Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1479 (10th Cir.) (assumed but did not decide that
front pay may be awarded, but concluded that repromotion was more appropriate than
front pay), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276,
283-84 (3d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff's failure to seek reinstatement precluded determination of
the front pay issue); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1022-23 (Ist Cir. 1979) (dis-
cussed possible guidelines for front pay without making a final determination as its to
appropriateness).
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982) (ADEA incorporating aspects of FLSA, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 211, 216-217 (1970)); see also Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 578-80 (1978)
(noting incorporation); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727 (2d Cir.
1984) (same); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1020 (1st Cir. 1979) (same); 113
Cong. Rec. 31,253 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Yarborough); 113 Cong. Rec. 7076 (1967)
(statement of Sen. Javits); Punitive Damages, supra note 9, at 460-61 (noting incorpora-
tion); Note, Damage Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 43
Brooklyn L. Rev. 47, 64 & n.66 (1976) (same) [hereinafter cited as Damage Remedies].
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982); 3 FRES, supra note 1, § 21:1; Steinberg, Wages and
Hours 112-13 (1982); U.S. Dep't of Labor, Handy Reference Guide to the Fair Labor
Standards Act 3-16 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Reference Guide].
17. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982). The FLSA provides: "Any employer who violates the
provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or
employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid over-
time compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages." Id.; see Wirtz v. Malthor, Inc., 391 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1968); Neal v.
Braughton, 111 F. Supp. 775, 779 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Commerce Clearing House, Guide-
book to Federal Wage-Hour Laws § 1007, at 299-300 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Guide-
book]; Reference Guide, supra note 16, at 16.
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addition, unless the employer can establish that the violation was in good
faith,' 8 the plaintiff will recover "liquidated damages" in an amount
equal to the back pay award.' 9 Thus, under the FLSA, plaintiffs can
recover a net amount equal to twice their back pay award."z
Under the ADEA, an employer generally is liable for back pay due an
employee from the date of the violation to the date of judgment.2' As
under the FLSA,22 an employer may also be liable for liquidated dam-
ages in an amount equal to the back pay award. 3 The ADEA departs
from the FLSA, however, in that it requires the plaintiff to prove that the
18. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1982). The Portal-to-Portal Pay Act, id. §§ 251-262, enables an
employer subject to an FLSA action for recovery of unpaid minimum wages, overtime
compensation and liquidated damages, see infra note 24 and accompanying text, to es-
cape liability for liquidated damages by "show[ing] to the satisfaction of the court that
the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith." 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1982);
see Flores Hernandez v. 65 de Infanteria Thorn McAn, Inc., 516 F.2d 1293, 1296 (1st
Cir. 1975); Majchrzak v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 537 F. Supp. 33, 38 (E.D. Mich. 1981);
Martinez v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 283 F. Supp. 514, 524 (E.D. Idaho 1968), af'd per
curiam, 424 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1970); Guidebook, supra note 17, § 1007.10, at 306; Com-
ment, Age Discrimination: Monetary Damages Under the Federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 58 Neb. L. Rev. 214, 225 n.76 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Monetary
Damages].
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1982). The Supreme Court has held that liquidated damages
under the FLSA are not penal in nature, but serve as "compensation for the retention of a
workman's pay which might result in damages too obscure and difficult of proof for esti-
mate other than by liquidated damages." Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697,
707 (1945); see Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1942);
Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Guidebook, supra note 17,
§ 1007.10, at 306.
20. See 2 H. Eglit, supra note 10, § 18.14, at 18-61 n.2; Guidebook, supra note 17, at
§§ 1007.3, 1007.10; Reference Guide, supra note 16, at 16; Monetary Damages, supra
note 18, at 214, 224-25. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). The amount of back pay is usually the difference
between the compensation the employee would have received absent the unlawful dis-
charge and compensation actually received from other employment. Fiedler v. Indian-
head Truck Line, 670 F.2d 806, 808 (8th Cir. 1982); see Brennan v. Ace Hardware
Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 373 (8th Cir. 1974). Such an award is within the discretion of the
trial court. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 160 (7th Cir. 1981). In
addition to wages, courts have construed back pay to include pension benefits, see Kelly
v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 986 n.20 (9th Cir. 1981); Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1021 (Ist Cir. 1979); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp
706, 713 (E.D. Wis. 1978), health insurance benefits, see Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp. 696
F.2d 1176, 1185 (6th Cir. 1983); Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 161
(7th Cir. 1981), disability benefits, see Bishop v. Jelleff Assoc., 398 F. Supp. 579, 597
(D.D.C 1974), accrued sick leave, see Alford v. City of Lubbock, 484 F. Supp. 1001,
1004-05 (N.D. Tex. 1979), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982), and profit sharing benefits,
see Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841, 844 (W.D. Okla. 1976). See
generally 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note 2, § 103.41(b) (other financial benefits
includible in back pay described); B. Schlei & P. Grossman, supra note 1, at 522-23.
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982). See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982); see Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978);
Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 280 (8th Cir. 1983); Syvock v.
Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 154 (7th Cir. 1981); Kelly v. American Stan-
dard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 1981); 1 FRES, supra note 1, § 5:88, at 76; Smith
& Leggette, Recent Issues in Litigation Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
41 Ohio St. L.J. 349, 369 (1980).
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employer's discriminatory action was willful in order to receive a liqui-
dated damages award.2 4 Another way in which the ADEA differs from
the FLSA is that a conciliation process administered by the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is a prerequisite to suit
under the ADEA.2"
24. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Under the FLSA, the burden is on the employer to establish
his good faith in order to avoid liability for liquidated damages. See supra notes 18-20
and accompanying text. The ADEA's willfulness standard was clarified by the Supreme
Court in Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 53 U.S.L.W. 4024 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1985). The
Court stated that "a violation [of the ADEA] is 'willful' if 'the employer ... knew or
showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the
ADEA.'" Id. at 4028 (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, 713 F.2d
940,956 (2d Cir. 1983), afl'd inpart, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Trans World
Airlines v. Thurston, 53 U.S.L.W. 4024 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1985)). The Court analogized to
criminal standards for willfulness, arguing that the ADEA's legislative history shows that
Congress intended a liquidated damage award to be punitive. Thurston, 53 U.S.LW. at
4027. This conclusion was based in part on Senator Javits' remarks, 113 Cong. Rec. 7076
(1967), indicating that under the ADEA, double (liquidated) damages should substitute
for the FLSA's criminal penalties for willful violations. Thurston, 53 U.S.LW. at 4027.
Compare 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982) (ADEA's liquidated damages for willful violations)
with id. § 216(a) (FLSA's criminal penalties for willful violations).
The Supreme Court has thus adopted the position of several lower courts that have
held that liquidated damages are punitive in nature. See, e.g., Kelly v. American Stan-
dard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 1981); Kalli v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 516 F. Supp.
1273, 1275-76 (D. Minn. 1981) (quoting Gifford v. B.D. Diagnostics, 458 F. Supp. 462,
464 (N.D. Ohio 1978)); Pavlo v. Stiefel Laboratories, Inc., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 489, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). This view contradicts the Conference Committee Re-
port to the 1978 ADEA amendments, which stated that "[t]he ADEA as amended by
this act does not provide remedies of a punitive nature." H.R. Rep. No. 950, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 528, 535. The Conference
Committee supported this view by citing a Supreme Court FLSA case that held that
liquidated damages are not a penalty but are available "in order to provide full compensa-
tory relief for losses that are 'too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by
liquidated damages.'" Id., reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 535 (quot-
ing Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1942)). The Supreme
Court has now indicated, however, that the liquidated damages provisions under the two
acts should be regarded differently: Under the FLSA, liquidated damages do not serve a
punitive function; there are criminal penalties available under that act. Liquidated dam-
ages are punitive, however, under the ADEA. See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 53
U.S.L.W. 4024, 4027 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1985). Courts have also distinguished the liquidated
damages provisions in the two acts in another way. Whereas an employer may escape
liability for liquidated damages under the FLSA by proving that his actions were in good
faith, see supra note 18 and accompanying text, a majority of circuits that have consid-
ered the question have ruled that the good faith defense should not be available under the
ADEA. See, e.g., EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1234
(10th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985); Hill v.
Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233, 238 (6th Cir. 1983); Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d
127, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1981); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 981 (9th Cir.
1981); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1003, 1020 (1st Cir. 1979). But see Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088,
1096 (5th Cir. 1981) (employer may escape liquidated damages if actions taken in good
faith).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). The Act requires that "[b]efore instituting any action
under this section, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall attempt to
eliminate the discriminatory practice or practices alleged, and to effect voluntary compli-
ance with the requirements of this chapter through informal methods of conciliation,
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A final difference between the FLSA and the ADEA is the wrong to-
ward which each was directed. Whereas the FLSA is primarily con-
cerned with redressing denial of minimum wages due employees,2 6 the
ADEA has as its focus the rights of workers who were discharged or not
hired because of age discrimination." In this sense it is more analogous
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,28 which prohibits employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.2 9 The ADEA has its roots in Title VII30 and shares that act's
conference, and persuasion." Id. ADEA enforcement was transferred from the Depart-
ment of Labor to the EEOC as part of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg.
19,807 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. 111-12 app. (West Supp. 1984), and in 92 Stat.
3781 (1978). This transfer was challenged after the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha,
103 S. Ct. 2764, 2788 (1983), questioned the validity of statutes containing legislative veto
provisions such as the Reorganization Act. See EEOC v. CBS, 743 F.2d 969, 970-71 (2d
Cir. 1984). But see Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC, 743 F.2d 380, 387-88 (6th Cir. 1984)
(Chadha did not invalidate transfer of ADEA enforcement to the EEOC). Congress re-
solved this problem in 1984 by enacting the Reorganization Plan of 1978, thereby pro-
tecting the EEOC's authority to enforce the ADEA, the Equal Pay Act and § 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Reorg. Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-614, 1984
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 98 Stat. 3192 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 903-912); see
130 Cong. Rec. S10,938-39 (daily ed., Sept. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
The EEOC compliance manual describes the objectives of conciliation and specific con-
ciliation devices. According to the manual, the specific objective of conciliation is "to
achieve a just resolution of all violations found and to obtain an agreement with the
respondent to eliminate the unlawful employment practices, to provide full retroactive
and prospective relief for all aggrieved persons, and to insure that the practices do not
recur in the future." EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) 260:0001, at 323 (1982).
Courts have differed on the standards required for conciliation before a suit may be
brought. The court in Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 374 (8th Cir.
1974), required "exhaustive" conciliation efforts before legal action could begin. The
Brennan court enunciated a three part prerequisite to suit: The employer must be told
what the Secretary and the Act require of him, he must be informed of the possibility of
litigation should the matter not be resolved, and he must be given a chance to respond at
least orally to the charges. Id. at 375. Other courts have questioned this "exhaustive"
standard. See Marshall v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 78 F.R.D. 97, 104 (D. Conn. 1978)
("reasonable" rather than "exhaustive" standard upheld); cf. EEOC v. Chrysler Corp.,
546 F. Supp. 54, 63 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (plaintiff may proceed directly to litigation if
defendant states that it does not believe that it is guilty of wrongdoing), afftd, 733 F.2d
1183 (6th Cir. 1984); Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 461 F. Supp. 362, 370 (D. Md.
1978) (court may stay an action while conciliation proceeds anew), afftd in part, rev'd in
part on other grounds, 632 F. 2d 1107 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 825 (1981).
A less rigid application of the conciliation requirement was supported in the Senate Re-
port of the Committee on Human Resources in consideration of the 1978 amendments to
the ADEA. See S. Rep. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 504, 516.
26. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
27. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982); see Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441
U.S. 750, 756 (1979); Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583-85 (1978); Coke v. Gen-
eral Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F.2d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 1981); Chappell v. Emco
Mach. Works, 601 F.2d 1295, 1301 (5th Cir. 1979).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
30. The origins of the ADEA date from the passage of Title VII in 1964. See EEOC
v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 229 (1983); C. Edelman & I. Siegler, supra note 3, at 69.
Proposals to include the prohibitions of age discrimination in Title VII were rejected
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dual purpose of making plaintiffs whole3" and deterring future discrimi-
nation. 2 Because of this common purpose, courts have frequently con-
because of concern that such inclusion would jeopardize the passage of the Civil Rights
Act and the belief that the question of age discrimination needed further study. See
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 229 (1983); 110 Cong. Rec. 2598-99 (1964) (statements
of Rep. Goodell, Rep. Rooney and Rep. Roosevelt); Malin, supra note 1, § 16.01, at 16-3;
see also Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 380,
381 (1976) (discussing reasons for not including age in Title VII). Title VII did, however,
mandate that the Secretary of Labor write and transmit to Congress "a complete study of
the factors which might tend to result in discrimination in employment because of age
and of the consequences of such discrimination on the economy and individuals affected."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1970), superseded by Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 10, 86 Stat. 103, 111 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14
(1982)); see EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 230 (1983). This report became the basis
for the ADEA. See supra note 1. See H.R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2,
reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News Ist Sess., 2213, 2214 (describing origins
of ADEA in Title VII); 113 Cong. Rec. 34,742-43 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Matsunaga on
the need for the ADEA to extend to the older worker protections similar to those in Title
VII).
31. See Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978); 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1982).
Cases under the ADEA have stressed its purpose of making whole a worker who has
been unlawfully discharged. See, e.g., Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724,
727-28 (2d Cir. 1984); Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir.
1984); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980),
cerL denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1238 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978). Similarly, Title VII cases have stressed the aim
of making plaintiffs whole. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764
(1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975); Locke v. Kansas City
Power & Light Co., 660 F.2d 359, 367-68 (8th Cir. 1981); see also 118 Cong. Rec. 7168
(1972) (section-by-section analysis of 1972 Act; § 706(g) of Title VII "intended to make
victims . . . whole"). See generally Punitive Damages, supra note 9, at 473 (noting simi-
larity of aims and prohibitions of ADEA and Title VII).
The legislative history of the ADEA reveals Congress' goals of protecting and increas-
ing the employment opportunites of older workers. See H.R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2213, 2220-25 (purposes of
the ADEA described in section-by-section analysis); see also 113 Cong. Rec. 34,745
(1967) (remarks of Rep. Daniels that the "affirmative purpose" of the ADEA is to pro-
mote the employment of older workers); 113 Cong. Rec. 34,744 (1967) (remarks of Rep.
Pucinski that the ADEA will serve the need to "legislate against one of the cruelest forms
of discrimination"). See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
32. ADEA cases have stressed the Act's purpose of eliminating discrimination
against older workers. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231-32 (1983); Rodriguez
v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1236-37 (3d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 436 U.S 913 (1978);
Macellaro v. Goldman, 643 F.2d 813, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Koyen v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Remarks by members of Congress
before passage of the ADEA reveal their emphasis on this purpose of the act. See, e.g.,
113 Cong. Rec. 34,74647 (1967) (remarks by Rep. Dent that the "essential purpose (of
the ADEA is] the employment of older workers based on their ability"); 113 Cong. Rec.
7077 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits on the need for legislation that will "protect the
opportunites of our older workers to find employment").
Cases under Title VII have also emphasized its purposes of promoting employment
and deterring discrimination. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421
(1975); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971); Bowe v.
Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969); EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross,
Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
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sidered the remedies available under Title VII when interpreting the
ADEA. 3
The ADEA's nature as an anti-discrimination statute accounts for its
further departure from the FLSA remedies. Its provision for other "legal
and equitable relief" should allow a court to restore a worker to the posi-
tion he would have occupied had the employer's discriminatory acts not
occurred.3 4 The broad language of the statute permits remedies other
than those specifically listed,3 but the precise nature and scope of these
additional remedies are still uncertain. Several district courts have read
this broad remedial grant as justifying awards of compensatory damages
for pain and suffering36 or of punitive damages.3 7 Nearly all of the cir-
422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975)), affd mem., 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920
(1977).
33. See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979); Spagnuolo v.
Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1983); Purtill v. Harris, 658 F.2d 134,
137 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3110 (1983); Coke v. General Adjustment
Bureau, Inc., 640 F.2d 584, 594-95 (5th Cir. 1981); Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525
F.2d 92, 94 (8th Cir. 1975); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 316 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1045 (1975); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 404 F. Supp. 324,
328 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1022 (1978); see also Damage Remedies, supra note 15, at 61-62 & n.57 (noting
ADEA-Title VII relationship); Punitive Damages, supra note 9, at 472-73 (same); Mone-
tary Damages, supra note 18, at 215-16 (same).
34. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727-28 (2d Cir. 1984);
Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Prudential
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1231 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds,
53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp.
1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Basic Law, supra note 3, at 31; Punitive Damages, supra note
9, at 468-69; cf Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) ("Congress made plain
its decision to follow a different course in the ADEA [than in the FLSA] by permitting
'such . . . equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the
ADEA] .... (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1982)). See infra notes 53-70 and accompa-
nying text.
35. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727-28 (2d Cir. 1984);
Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945
(1981); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see
also Smith & Leggette, supra note 23, at 366 (discussing ADEA's additional grant of legal
and equitable relief). The court in Vazquez v. Eastern Airlines, 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir.
1978), although denying damages for pain and suffering, stressed that this denial should
not "permanently foreclos[e] remedies which might prove essential to guarantee the in-
tegrity of the statute." Id. at 112.
36. See, e.g., Brenimer v. Great Western Sugar Co., 567 F. Supp 218, 224 (D. Colo.
1983); Wise v. Olan Mills Inc., 485 F. Supp. 542, 544-45 (D. Colo. 1980); Flynn v.
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 463 F. Supp. 676, 679 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Gifford v. B.D.
Diagnostics, 458 F. Supp. 462, 464 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc.,
421 F. Supp. 841, 847 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 404
F. Supp. 324, 327-33 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1022 (1978). Courts supporting compensatory damages for pain and suffering
and punitive damages have argued that because the ADEA established a new statutory
tort, "the panoply of usual tort remedies is available to recompense injured parties for all
provable damages." Rogers, 404 F. Supp. at 327; cf Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195
(1974) ("a damages action under [Title VII] sounds basically in tort"). The district court
in Rogers reasoned that out-of-pocket economic loss is not sufficient to compensate for
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cuit courts of appeals, however, have rejected these awards,3" some argu-
ing that reinstatement and an award of back pay are sufficient to assuage
the pain and suffering of a discharged ADEA plaintiff.39
In some cases, however, reinstatement may be inappropriate or impos-
sible." For example, animosity between an employer and employee may
be so great that reinstatement would create an untenable situation for
both parties.41 When reinstatement is not appropriate, the only way to
make a plaintiff whole may be a front pay award. 2 Although it may be
the psychological effects of age discrimination, Rogers, 404 F. Supp. at 330, and found
further support in the legislative history of the ADEA, Id. at 330 n.3, and through anal-
ogy to other discrimination statutes, id. See generally 2 H. Eglit, supra note 10, § 18.20
(discussing arguments for compensatory damages for pain and suffering); Note, Damages
in Age Discrimination Casesv A Closer Look, 17 U. Rich. L. Rev. 573, 580-82 (1983)
(advocating compensatory damages for pain and suffering); Monetary Damages, supra
note 18, at 234-43 (same).
37. See, eg., Kennedy v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 449 F. Supp. 1008, 1010-11
(D. Colo. 1978); Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453, 463 (E.D. Ark. 1976); Murphy v.
American Motors Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403, 1405 (N.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd, 570 F.2d
1226 (5th Cir. 1978). See generally Punitive Damages, supra note 9 (arguing for punitive
damages under the ADEA).
38. See, eg., Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 146.48 (2d
Cir. 1984); Perrell v. FinanceAmerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 657 (10th Cir. 1984); Hill v.
Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233, 235-36 (6th Cir. 1983); Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, 670
F.2d 806, 809-10 (8th Cir. 1982); Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 687-88 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1039 (1982); Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 698-99
(9th Cir. 1981); Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1296 (4th Cir. 1979);
Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, 579 F.2d 107, 109-10 (Ist Cir. 1978); Dean v. American
Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038-40 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978);
Rogers v. Exxon Research and Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 839-42 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); see J. Krauskopf, supra note 2, § 11.1 (Supp. 1984).
In denying these awards courts have reasoned that the ADEA's specific reference to
the FLSA limits any monetary damages to back pay and liquidated damages as defined
under that statute, see Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 147-48
(2d Cir. 1984), that the legislative history of the ADEA makes no specific mention of pain
and suffering damages, see Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, 670 F.2d 806, 810 (8th Cir.
1982), that the legislative history of the 1978 amendments specifically precludes remedies
of a punitive nature, see Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 14748
(2d Cir. 1984), that liquidated damages are available in the case of a willful violation of
the Act, see id. at 147, that the possibility of large awards for pain and suffering would
undermine the conciliation process by encouraging plaintiffs to resist settlement, see id.;
Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1022 (1978), and that Title VII has not been interpreted to permit these awards,
Covey v. Robert A. Johnston Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1188, 1191 (D. Md.
1977).
39. See Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1295-96 (4th Cir. 1979);
Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Dean v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir.
1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d
107, 112 (1st Cir. 1978).
40. See infra notes 100-15 and accompanying text.
41. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727 (2d Cir. 1984) (Union
Carbide exhibited "hostility and outrage" toward the plaintiff) (quoting 567 F. Supp.
1320, 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
42. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984); Davis
v. Combustion Eng'g Co., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984); Ventura v. Federal Life Ins.
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argued that front pay is not necessary because the plaintiff can secure
other employment,4 3 this argument fails to acknowledge that most older
workers face great difficulties in obtaining similar employment. 4 Per-
Co., 571 F. Supp. 48, 50 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F.
Supp. 1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); cf O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 574
F. Supp. 214, 222 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (front pay appropriate given plaintiff's position after
discharge), affid in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 748 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984);
Hoffman v. Nissan Motor Corp., 511 F. Supp. 352, 355 (D.N.H. 1981) (plaintiff awarded
$20,000 plus pension rights).
43. See Covey v. Robert A. Johnston Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1188,
1192 (D. Md. 1977) (front pay inappropriate when plaintiff has many employable years
ahead); Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971)
(plaintiff's prospects for future employment cut off employer's liability).
44. The report that was the basis for the ADEA recognized the difficulty older work-
ers experience in gaining employment, see U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Older American
Worker: Age Discrimination in Employment 67-70 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Older
American Worker], and was included in the Statement of Findings and Purpose of the
Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(3) (1982). Conditions have not significantly improved since
the ADEA became law in 1968. Although older Americans generally have a low rate of
unemployment, see Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment and
Earnings 51 (Jan. 1984), this data alone fails to reflect the serious problem of long term
unemployment among older workers. See Rones, The Labor Market Problems of Older
Workers, 106 Monthly Lab. Rev., May 1983, at 3, 10. Older workers "are far less likely
to find a job than their younger counterparts." Id.; see C. Edelman & I. Siegler, supra
note 3, at 7; 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note 2, § 98.20. When they do find work it is
likely to be at a much lower salary than their previous employment. Rones, supra, at 10
(citing data showing much lower wages of retirees who returned to work or displaced
older workers who later found jobs). In 1965 it was found that older workers do not
recover as quickly from recessions as do younger workers, Older American Worker,
supra, at 67-70, and the situation is the same today. Comparative figures from 1982-84
show improvement in long term unemployment for all age groups during the 1983-84
recovery except workers between 55 and 64:
PERCENT OF TOTAL UNEMPLOYED IN EACH AGE GROUP WHO
WERE UNEMPLOYED OVER 15 WEEKS
Age Group Dec. 1982 Dec. 1983 Sept. 1984
16-19 27.6 21.8 14.6
20-24 36.3 31.1 22.5
25-34 39.1 38.5 28.4
35-44 42.4 40.9 33.1
45-54 45.3 42.7 37.2
55-64 43.9 45.2 52.0
65- 38.7 44.3 37.1
Adapted from Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment and Earn-
ings 33 (Jan. 1984), and from Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employ-
ment and Earnings 24 (Oct. 1984). In September 1984, the average duration of
unemployment for workers age 55-64 was 27.8 weeks, compared to 13.5 weeks for work-
ers 20-24 and 21.5 weeks for workers 45-54. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department
of Labor, Employment and Earnings 24 (Oct. 1984). The relatively lower level of long-
term unemployment for workers between 40-54 might be a rationale for front pay awards
covering shorter periods for such plaintiffs. See infra note 209.
In spite of their problems in regaining jobs once unemployed, many older workers want
to continue working. See Harris, Myths and Realities of Life for Older Americans, in The
New Old 90, 112 (R. Gross, B. Gross, & S. Seidman ed. 1978) (poll of older Americans
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mitting front pay awards would not solve the immediate problems of the
increasing number of older Americans who want to continue working.
The remedy is essential, however, to make discriminatorily discharged
workers whole, given the difficulties they face in regaining their former
salary, status and job satisfaction.45 Without the front pay remedy, the
scheme of relief designed to effectuate the purposes of the Act would be
incomplete.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND FRONT PAY
Support for the availability of front pay can be found in the ADEA's
language" and legislative history.47 The ADEA has been deemed a "re-
medial statute"48-- one that provides a remedy "for the enforcement of
showed that nearly one half preferred not to retire); cf. H. Sheppard & S. Rix, supra note
1, at 164-65 (excess of job applications for funded jobs reserved for older workers indi-
cates desire of older Americans to continue to work). Many become discouraged, how-
ever, and give up their job search. McConnell, supra note 2, at 159-60. Most members of
this group give up their search because they perceive that employers believe that older
workers are too old for employment. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of
Labor, Employment and Earnings 65 (Jan. 1984).
The problems older workers encounter in obtaining employment after losing a job may
support more frequent use of preliminary injunctions in ADEA cases. See EEOC v.
Chrysler Corp., 546 F. Supp. 54, 66-71 (E.D. Mich. 1982), af'd, 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir.
1984). In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs must prove four factors: a
strong or substantial likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury, lack of sub-
stantial harm to others including the defendant, and that the public interest would be
served by issuing a preliminary injunction. Id. at 66 (citing Mason County Medical Ass'n
v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256, 261 (6th Cir. 1977)). The difficulties of older workers discussed
supra are strong evidence that a discharge would cause irreparable harm to a plaintiff in
many cases. Furthermore, the legislative history of the ADEA shows recognition by
members of Congress that discharge of a worker late in life may cause such harm. See
supra note 30, infra notes 68, 212 and accompanying text. This legislative history would
also lend support to the "public interest" element of the preliminary injunction test. The
other two factors in the test would be determined on a case-by-case basis. See EEOC v.
Chrysler Corp., 546 F. Supp. at 66-71. For example, a finding of a high degree of animos-
ity between the employer and employee may preclude a preliminary injunction on the
basis of the "harm to others" element of the test. Such a finding of animosity might also
preclude reinstatement after plaintiff's success on the merits, see infra note 101 and ac-
companying text, and be a basis for an award of front pay, see infra notes 116, 117 and
accompanying text. See infra note 77 and accompanying text (Title VII awards of front
pay because of antagonism between employer and employee).
45. "The willingness of federal appellate courts to condone front pay awards in
ADEA actions is grounded in the perception that an older plaintiff is unlikely to easily
relocate after being terminated following long service with one employer." Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, Front Pay Remedy Sustained by Second. Sixth and
Tenth Circuits, Labor and Employment Law Newsletter, Sept. 1984, at 5 (available in
files of Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Front Pay Remedy]. See supra notes
42-44 and accompanying text.
46. O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1551 (11th Cir.
1984). See infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
48. See Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d 1221, 1229 (3d Cir.
1978); Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 434 U.S. 99
(1977); EEOC v. Borden's Inc., 551 F. Supp. 1095, 1100 (D. Ariz. 1982), aff'd, 724 F.2d
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rights and the redress of injuries" 49-because it affords a remedy to those
who have been discriminated against on the basis of age." As such, it
should be given a liberal construction in order to "suppress the evil and
advance the remedy" and "effectuate the remedial purpose for which it
was enacted."5 1 The place of front pay in the ADEA's scheme of relief
must be analyzed in terms of the degree to which it helps to achieve the
Act's two purposes: restoring plaintiffs to the position they would have
occupied but for the illegal discrimination and deterring future age dis-
crimination by employers.2
A. Language, Legislative History and FLSA Precedent
Opponents of front pay have argued that the ADEA's specific incorpo-
ration of the FLSA provisions limits any monetary relief under the stat-
ute to back pay and liquidated damages.53 This narrow view fails to
afford the ADEA the liberal construction it merits as a remedial stat-
ute. 4 In addition, the narrow view misinterprets the ADEA's language.
In passing the Act, Congress "exhibited both detailed knowledge of the
FLSA provisions and their judicial interpretation and a willingness to
depart from those provisions regarded as undesirable or inappropriate for
incorporation."55 The most important departure from the FLSA is the
ADEA's broad grant of "legal and equitable relief. . . without limita-
1390 (9th Cir. 1984); Jackson v. Alcan Sheet & Plate, 462 F. Supp. 82, 87 (N.D.N.Y.
1978); 3 C. Sands, supra note 9, § 60.02, at 15.
49. 3 C. Sands, supra note 9, § 60.02, at 31.
50. See Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1260, (10th Cir. 1976), afid, 434 U.S.
99 (1977); Jackson v. Alcan Sheet & Plate, 462 F. Supp. 82, 87 (N.D.N.Y. 1978); Hall v.
United States, 436 F. Supp. 505, 509 (D. Minn. 1977).
51. 3 C. Sands, supra note 9, § 60.01, at 29; see Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, 579
F.2d 107, 109 (1st Cir. 1978); Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir.
1976), afid, 434 U.S. 99 (1977); Jackson v. Alcan Sheet & Plate, 462 F. Supp. 82, 87
(N.D.N.Y. 1978); E. Crawford, The Construction of Statutes § 73, at 107 (1940).
52. Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
See supra notes 31, 32 and accompanying text.
53. See EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1235 (6th Cir.
1984) (Barrett, J., dissenting), vacated on other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15,
1985); Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1481 (10th Cir.) (Seth, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984); Grecco v. Spang & Co., 566 F. Supp. 413, 415 (W.D.
Pa. 1983); Ginsberg v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 696, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
see also Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 582 F. Supp. 80, 84 (D.P.R. 1984) (Congress
specifically limited monetary damages to unpaid wages); Helwig v. Suburban Chevrolet,
Inc., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1261, 1266-67 (D. Md. 1983) (front pay is beyond
the scope of the statute's remedial scheme); Kiel v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 33 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1122, 1123 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (Congress limited "damage
awards for loss of income only up to the time of trial"); cf Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694
F.2d 869, 874 n.4 (1st Cir. 1982) (ADEA "damages are 'settled' on the date of judg-
ment"); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1022 (1st Cir. 1979) (ADEA's remedial
grant is expansive, but remedies "limited for the most part by the remedies available
under the FLSA").
54. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
55. Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978).
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tion."56 This additional language would be superfluous"' if equitable re-
lief were limited to the specific measures listed.5" It follows that the
additional grant of legal and equitable relief "without limitation" should
encompass any other forms of relief that serve the same ends as those
remedies enumerated. 9 If reinstatement is not appropriate," only an
award of front pay can effectuate the ADEA's purpose of making the
plaintiff whole after a discriminatory discharge.6
The ADEA's legislative history also indicates that front pay is an ap-
propriate remedy. During the debate preceding the Act's passage, Sena-
tor Javits spoke of the beneficial aspects of incorporating FLSA
enforcement.62 His remarks have been cited as evidence of congressional
intent to confine the ADEA remedies to those enumerated in the
FLSA.63 A full reading of Senator Javits' remarks, however, reveals a
primarily administrative motive for incorporation of FLSA procedures. 6
The bill's sponsors sought to avoid the creation of a new bureaucracy
solely to enforce the ADEA61 and saw the Wage and Hour Division of
56. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). See supra notes 9, 34 and accompanying text.
57. A fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that effect must be given to
all the provisions of a statute "so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous." 2A C.
Sands, supra note 9, § 46.06.
58. See Punitive Damages, supra note 9, at 468-69.
59. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984); Davis
v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Prudential Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 53
U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312,
1319 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 567
F. Supp. 1320, 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984); Koyen v. Con-
solidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); O'Donnell v. Georgia
Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 214, 218-19 (N.D. Ga. 1982), aff'd in part. rev'd in
part on other grounds, 748 F.2d 1543 (1Ith Cir. 1984); Pavlo v. Stiefel Laboratories, Inc.,
22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 489, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
60. See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
61. See O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1551 (11 th Cir.
1984). See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
62. See 113 Cong. Rec. 31,254 (1967); 113 Cong. Rec. 7076 (1967).
63. See, eg., Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 686 (7th Cir.), cerL denied,
459 U.S. 1039 (1982); Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1295 (4th Cir.
1979); Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, 579 F.2d 107, 110 (1st Cir. 1978); cf. Fiedler v.
Indianhead Truck Line, 670 F.2d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 1982) (Except for slight modifica-
tions, Congress intended to incorporate fully FLSA remedies and procedures.).
64. Senator Javits stressed the functional aspects of enforcing the ADEA through the
use of the Labor Department's Wage-Hour Office. See 113 Cong. Rec. 7076 (1967).
There is no discussion of the exclusivity of the FLSA remedies. Senator Javits' later
statement that the ADEA "incorporates by reference, to the greatest extent possible, the
provisions of the [FLSA]," 113 Cong. Rec. 31,254 (1967), appeared in the context of a
discussion of process rather than specific remedies. His analogy to the FLSA refers to
enforcement techniques and procedure, see id., rather than remedies. The ADEA's broad
grant of "other legal and equitable relief," see supra notes 9, 34 and accompanying text,
and its departure from the FLSA in its liquidated damages provisions, see supra note 24,
provide additional evidence suggesting that incorporation of the FLSA scheme was pri-
marily an administrative mechanism for the implementation of the ADEA and not a bar
to remedies other than those specifically provided by the FLSA.
65. By avoiding the creation of a new agency, the bill's sponsors sought to avoid
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the Department of Labor as an efficient mechanism for quick and inex-
pensive implementation of the Act." Thus, the ADEA's reference to
FLSA procedures should be viewed as a convenience rather than as a
strict limit on the ADEA's remedial scope.67
The legislative history also demonstrates Congress' acute sensitivity to
the difficulty and frustration encountered by older Americans seeking re-
entry into the job market.6" It would frustrate Congress' emphasis on the
plight of the older job seeker to deny full relief through front pay to a
plaintiff who cannot return to his former job.
Thus, the ADEA's additional language and legislative history indicate
that Congress intended to provide remedies beyond those available under
the incorporated provisions of the FLSA. Furthermore, future damages
in lieu of reinstatement have been upheld in FLSA actions brought in
response to retaliatory discharges of workers who have filed complaints
for violations of that act. 69 This precedent under the FLSA itself for
delays such as those encountered by the EEOC, which was "years behind in disposing of
its docket." 113 Cong. Rec. 7076 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits before the Labor Sub-
committee of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee).
66. Id; see 113 Cong. Rec. 31,254 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits).
67. See O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 214, 218-19
(N.D. Ga. 1982), aff#d in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 748 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.
1984); Pavlo v. Stiefel Laboratories, Inc., 22 Fair Empl. Prae. Cas. (BNA) 489, 493
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee at 24, Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc.,
742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1984).
The Supreme Court has stressed the procedural motive for use of the FLSA mecha-
nism. See Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978). The Court's analysis of the
FLSA incorporation as largely procedural is evident in the way in which it quotes the
ADEA: "[W]e find a significant indication of Congress' intent in its directive that the
ADEA be enforced in accordance with the 'powers, remedies and procedures' of the
FLSA." Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976)) (Court's emphasis).
68. The debate before passage of the ADEA demonstrates Congress' great concern
for the plight of older workers. Representative Randall noted that a person between 40
and 65 who loses his job "will have a most difficult time trying to find another one." 113
Cong. Rec. 34,750 (1967). This uncertain job market means that many in this age
bracket are in "constant fear" of loss of their jobs. Id. According to Representative
Dwyer, once an older worker loses a job "the chances against finding another like it are 6
to I against him" and "he faces the prospect of long months of frustration, fear, and
insecurity as he searches for a new one." 113 Cong. Rec. 34,751-52 (1967); see 113 Cong.
Rec. 34,751 (1967) (statement of Rep. Pepper); 113 Cong. Rec. 34,745 (1967) (statement
of Rep. Eilberg); 113 Cong. Rec. 31,256-57 (1967) (statement of Sen. Young); 113 Cong.
Rec. 7076 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits). President Johnson expressed similar con-
cerns in a Special Message to Congress, which helped lead to the passage of the Act. He
noted that joblessness caused by age discrimination was "[i]n economic terms. . . a seri-
ous-and senseless-loss to a nation on the move. But the greater loss is the cruel sacri-
fice in happiness and well-being which joblessness imposes on these citizens and their
families." Special Message to the Congress Proposing Programs for Older Americans, 1
Pub. Papers 32, 37 (1967).
69. Under the FLSA, it is unlawful "to discharge or in any other manner discriminate
against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or
caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or
is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an indus-
try committee. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1982).
In Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960), the Supreme Court
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awards of front pay to unlawfully discharged employees might be suffi-
cient to validate the remedy under the ADEA even absent Congress' ad-
ditional language.70
B. Front Pay Under Analagous Statutes
Analysis of front pay awards under statutes such as Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,71 the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA)72 and the Taft-Hartley Act73 provide further support for
the availability of front pay under the ADEA.
The Supreme Court has noted that the "prohibitions of the ADEA
were derived in haec verba from Title VII." '7 4 Front pay is an accepted
remedy under Title VII in certain circumstances. 7" The standard applied
gave lower courts wide discretion to fashion equitable relief under this section. Id. at 291.
Relying on DeMario, the court in Goldberg v. Bama Mfg. Corp., 302 F.2d 152 (5th Cir.
1962), held that future damages in lieu of reinstatement might be available to a wrong-
fully discharged plaintiff whose reinstatement is not appropriate. Id. at 156. An impor-
tant rationale for the holding was that the employer should not be able to violate the
FLSA without suffering some consequences. Id. The court saw a future damages award
as a way to "promote the purpose of the Act by reassuring employees that their right to
seek statutory relief will be protected." Id. at 156-57; see also Wirtz v. Atlas Roofing
Mfg. Co., 377 F.2d 112, 115 n.5 (5th Cir. 1967) (payment of S100 made to plaintiff in lieu
of reinstatement). The court in Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (Ist Cir. 1979).
analyzed this FLSA precedent as providing some support for ADEA damages in lieu of
reinstatement. Id. at 1022-23. Although the Loeb court did not hold for or against front
pay, its opinion has been cited by courts on both sides of the issue. Compare Hoffman v.
Nissan Motor Corp., 511 F. Supp. 352, 355-57 (D.N.H. 1981) (viewing Loeb analysis as
validating front pay) with Wildman v. Lerner Stores, 582 F. Supp. 80, 83-84 (D.P.R.
1984) (Loeb cited as authority against front pay). See also Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee
at 22-25, Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1984) (analysis of Loeb
as support for a front pay award).
70. . Cf. Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100-01 (8th Cir. 1982)
(FLSA precedent supported front pay award under ADEA); Hoffman v. Nissan Motor
Corp., 511 F. Supp. 352, 357 (D.N.H. 1981) (same).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying
text.
72. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codifed in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, 42 U.S.C.). See infra notes 81-89
and accompanying text.
73. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982). See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
74. Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). See supra notes 28-33 and ac-
companying text.
75. See, eg., Briseno v. Central Technical Community College Area, 739 F.2d 344,
348 (8th Cir. 1984); Weatherspoon v. Andrews & Co., 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1226, 1229 (D. Colo. 1983); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 292-93 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Locke v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 660 F.2d 359, 369 (8th Cir. 1981); EEOC v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 634 F.2d 1273, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986
(1981); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc. 624 F.2d 945, 955-58 (10th Cir. 1980); Hill v.
Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99, 104 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 929 (1979); White v.
Carolina Paperboard Corp., 564 F.2d 1073, 1091 (4th Cir. 1977); James v. Stockham
Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 358 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034
(1978); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 920 (1976); Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Center, 482 F. Supp. 918, 926-27
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291, 1320
(N.D. Cal. 1979), af#'d, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982); Chewning v. Schlesinger, 471 F.
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in determining whether front pay should be awarded is the degree to
which it will further the goals of ending illegal discrimination and recti-
fying the harm caused by such discrimination.76 Front pay in lieu of
reinstatement under Title VII has been justified in situations in which
antagonism between employer and employee is so great as to preclude
reinstatement 77 or in which no job is available for the plaintiff at the date
of judgment.78 Under both Title VII and the ADEA, front pay retains
its basic nature as the monetary equivalent of the equitable remedy of
reinstatement. 79 Furthermore, front pay is necessary to fulfill both stat-
utes' specific and general purposes: making the plaintiff whole and deter-
ring future discrimination.80
ERISA8" is another federal statute with aims similar to those of the
ADEA.s2 ERISA was enacted to provide for minimum standards for all
Supp. 767, 776 (D.D.C. 1979); EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919,
926-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affid mem., 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920
(1977).
76. See Briseno v. Central Technical Community College Area, 739 F.2d 344, 348
(8th Cir. 1984); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Patterson v.
American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir. 1976); cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (back pay award should fulfill Title VII's dual purpose
of eradicating discrimination and making plaintiffs whole).
77. See Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th Cir. 1980);
EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem.,
559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977); see also Fadhl v. City and
County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 1984) (front pay may be awarded
when antagonism precludes reinstatement).
78. Briseno v. Central Technical Community College Area, 739 F.2d 344, 348 (8th
Cir. 1984); White v. Carolina Paperboard Corp., 564 F.2d 1073, 1091 (4th Cir. 1977);
James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 358 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 268-69
(4th Cir.), cerL denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Center,
482 F. Supp. 918, 926-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 634 F.2d 1273,
1281-82 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 986 (1981); Chewning v. Schlesinger, 471
F. Supp. 767, 776-77 (D.D.C. 1979).
79. "The Supreme Court has given approval to the concept of an award of 'front pay'
in discrimination actions." EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 634 F.2d 1273, 1281 (10th Cir.
1980) (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1976)), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
986 (1981).
Cases under the ADEA awarding front pay have made clear that it is the equivalent of
the equitable remedy of reinstatement. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d
724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225,
1232 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1984);
Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); Cancellier v. Feder-
ated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982);
O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 214, 223 (N.D. Ga. 1983),
affid in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 748 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984); Koyen v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Front pay has also
been characterized as equitable relief in lieu of reinstatement under Title VII. Fitzgerald
v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th Cir. 1980).
80. See supra notes 31, 32, 75-78 and accompanying text.
81. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, 42 U.S.C.).
82. See Folz v. Marriott, No. 82-0219 (W.D. Mo. August 31, 1984) (available on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). Both statutes seek to prevent violations of employees'
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private pension plans 3 and includes specific prohibitions designed to pre-
vent "unscrupulous employers from discharging or harassing their em-
ployees in order to keep them from obtaining vested pension rights."8"
One court justified a front pay award to an unlawfully discharged ERISA
plaintiff by both analysis of ERISA's legislative history and comparison
of ERISA with other remedial statutes.8 5 ERISA's provision for "other
appropriate equitable relief' 6 is similar to the ADEA's grant of "legal
and equitable relief. . . without limitation,"8 " and the two statutes have
a shared philosophy of protecting employees against harassment and dis-
charge."8 In certain cases, a front pay award may be essential in order to
carry out the aims of both acts.8 9
Front pay awards under the Taft-Hartley Act---which gives employ-
ees the right to sue their unions9 1-have been upheld on the ground that
federal courts have the power to fashion effective remedies for the im-
pairment of federally created rights in the field of labor relations.92 Sim-
ilarly, that power should allow a court to award front pay in an ADEA
case.
The precedent for front pay under these similar federal statutes pro-
vides strong support for its acceptance under the ADEA. Such support
is also found in the statute's language and legislative history.93 In addi-
tion, there are persuasive policy arguments favoring the availability of
the remedy.
rights relating to retirement and retirement plans. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982)
(ADEA) with id. §§ 1132, 1140 (ERISA).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(2) (1982); see Folz v. Marriott, No. 82-0219 (W.D. Mo. August
31, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); ABA Division of Communicia-
tions, supra note 1, at 21.
84. West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1980); see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(b)(1)(B),
1140 (1982).
85. See Folz v. Marriott, No. 82-0219 (W.D. Mo. August 31, 1984) (available on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist fie). The plaintiff in Folz was illegally discharged after he
had contracted multiple sclerosis. The front pay award was justified under ERISA's pur-
pose to "recreate the circumstances that would have existed absent an employer's illegal
conduct." Id.
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1982).
87. Id. § 626(b). See supra notes 9, 34 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 2, 4, 31, 32, 84 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 52, 84, 85 and accompanying text.
90. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982).
91. Id. § 185.
92. De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 292 (Ist
Cir. 1970) (citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957)),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970); Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 367
F.2d 489, 493 (4th Cir. 1966) (same), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 960 (1967); see also Richard-
son v. Communication Workers, 443 F.2d 974, 985 (8th Cir. 1971) (award of damages
under the Taft-Hartley Act "should embrace future earnings"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 818
(1973).
93. See supra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
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III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Discussion of the ADEA's remedial scheme requires an analysis of the
Act's emphasis on reinstatement, 94 conciliation9' and avoidance of overly
speculative remedies. 96 This section discusses the interaction of front pay
with each of these considerations.
A. Front Pay and Reinstatement: Necessary Complements in a
Scheme of Equitable Relief
The preferred remedy under the ADEA is reinstatement of the plain-
tiff to the job from which he was unlawfully discharged.9" The statute
expressly mentions reinstatement98 and courts have deemed this equita-
ble remedy to be appropriate in many cases. 99 In several situations, how-
ever, reinstatement has been held to be unacceptable for both employer
and employee. °" One such situation is when animosity is so severe that
reinstatement would create untenable conditions for both parties.' 0 An-
94. See infra notes 97-117 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 118-33 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 134-54 and accompanying text.
97. EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir.
1984), vacated on other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (Jan. 15, 1985); Blim v. Western Elec.
Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1479 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984); Babb v. Sun Co.,
562 F. Supp. 491, 492 (D. Minn. 1983); see Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d
724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984); Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 280 (8th
Cir. 1983); Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 141, 144 (S.D. Ohio 1983); 3 A. Larson
& L. Larson, supra note 2, § 103.30, at 21-324 to -326.
98. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
99. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984);
Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1320 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 859 (1982); Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 141, 143 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Bishop
v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579, 596 (D.D.C. 1974); 2 Eglit, supra note 10, § 18.14; 1
FRES, supra note 1, § 5:87.
100. See infra notes 101-15 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1984);
EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 1984),
vacated on other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985); Dickerson v. Deluxe
Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 281 (8th Cir. 1983); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't
Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Chern v. Ogden
Food Serv. Corp., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1547, 1548 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Merkel
v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 141, 144 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Hoffman v. Nissan Motor Corp.,
511 F. Supp. 352, 355 (D.N.H. 1981); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp.
841, 846-47 (W.D. Okla. 1976). See supra note 78 (animosity in Title VII context).
In Whittlesey v. Union Carbide, 567 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affid, 742 F.2d
724 (2d Cir. 1984), the plaintiff had been Chief Labor Counsel for Union Carbide, which
mandatorily retired him at 65 under the bona fide executive exception of the ADEA. Id.
at 1321; see 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1) (1982); Kandel, supra note 2, at 672-76. The district
court ruled that Whittlesey's position did not fall in this category, 567 F. Supp. at 1328,
and recommended front pay because reinstatement would have been disastrous for both
parties, id. at 1330-31. Some courts have held that when antagonism results solely from
litigation, it is not sufficient to preclude reinstatment. See, e.g, Dickerson v. Deluxe
Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 281 (8th Cir. 1983); Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 648
F.2d 1129, 1138 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 969 (1981); Merkel v. Scovill, 570 F.
Supp. 141, 144 (S.D. Ohio 1983). In Whittlesey, however, the district court ruled that the
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other is where the plaintiff is a high managerial employee:102 Courts
have reasoned that reinstatement creates greater burdens for both parties
when the plaintiff is close to the employer in the corporate hierarchy.°
3
A third situation in which reinstatement may be inappropriate is when
there would be no comparable job available to the plaintiff if he were to
obtain a favorable judgment.1 4 For example, plaintiffs who, if rein-
stated, would be required to relocate to an undesirable area have been
awarded the equivalent of front pay until comparable jobs became avail-
able. l10 Similarly, such a recovery has been awarded when reinstatement
would result in the displacement of an employee hired to replace the
plaintiff after the plaintiff's discharge but before the determination that
the discharge was discriminatory.10 6
antagonism that had developed during the litigation, primarily as a result of the defend-
ant's conduct, was sufficient to warrant front pay in lieu of reinstatement. 567 F. Supp. at
1330-31. In some cases, reinstatement of the plaintiff in a climate of animosity may lead
to continuing conflict with the employer and to further litigation. A court should not be
required "to supervise the employer/employee relationship over the length of a plaintiff's
lifetime; a task for which the courts are poorly suited." Heheman v. E.W. Scripps, Co.,
661 F.2d 1115, 1125 (6th Cir. 1981) (non-ADEA breach of employment contract case).
102. See Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 280 (8th Cir. 1983);
Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 141, 144 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Combes v. Griffin Televi-
sion, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841, 846 (V.D. Okla. 1976); cf. EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross,
Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 926-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Title VII plaintiff's job "required a close
working relationship between plaintiff and top executives of defendant."), aff'd, 559 F.2d
1203 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977).
103. See Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 280-81 (8th Cir.
1983) (courts have declined to reinstate plaintiffs in "high level" positions); Cancelier v.
Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1315, 1319 (9th Cir.) (court ruled reinstatement
of executives not appropriate), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 17
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1332, 1333-34 (D.R.I. 1978) (plaintiff's position "was, at
least, quasi-policy making in that [he] very directly participated in the carrying out of
[policies] in a large part of the world"), rev'd on other grounds, 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir.
1979); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841, 846-47 (W.D. Okla. 1976)
(close working relationship of plaintiffs and defendants precluded reinstatement). Con-
versely, reinstating a worker with little contact with management is likely to produce few
problems. See Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 280-81 (8th Cir.
1983); Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 489 (4th Cir. 1982).
104. See Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 116-20 (4th Cir. 1983); cf
Briseno v. Central Technical Community College Area, 739 F.2d 344, 348 (8th Cir. 1984)
(front pay awarded in Title VII case until plaintiff receives comparable position); EEOC
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 634 F.2d 1273, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 1980) (front pay awarded until
plaintiff's "rightful place" secured); White v. Carolina Paperboard Corp., 564 F.2d 1073,
1077 (4th Cir. 1977) (same).
105. See Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 118-19 (4th Cir. 1983); cf. Oil
Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 598, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(unlawfully discharged workers in NLRA case not required to accept employment that is
an unreasonable distance from home), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1078 (1977); Florence Print-
ing Co. v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 216, 221 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
106. See Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1983); cf.
Briseno v. Central Technical Community College Area, 739 F.2d 344, 348 (8th Cir. 1984)
(front pay awarded in Title VII case until plaintiff is able to assume comparable position);
EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 634 F.2d 1273, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 1980) (front pay
awarded in Title VII case until plaintiff is able to assume rightful place), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 986 (1981); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir.)
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A final situation that precludes reinstatement is abolition of the plain-
tiff's position for valid business reasons. 10 7 Courts have differed in their
analyses of such reductions in force. Some courts have viewed them as a
justification for ordering front pay in lieu of reinstatement. 10 8 One court
has extended this analysis to post-judgment reductions in force, granting
front pay in part because the probability of such reductions imperiled the
plaintiff's job security." 9
Other courts have allowed a plaintiff whose position has been elimi-
nated in good faith before trial to recover back pay only for the period
between his unlawful discharge and the elimination of his position. 110
(same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976). Some courts have held that reinstatement may
not be appropriate if a plaintiff has secured another job in the interval between discharge
and trial. See Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., No. 79-241, slip op. at 6 (E.D. Tenn.
Mar. 18, 1982), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1984);
Robb v. Chemetron Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1535, 1545 (S.D. Tex. 1978);
cf. Folz v. Marriott Corp., No. 82-0219 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 31, 1984) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (ERISA).
According to this view, a plaintiff who has fulfilled his duty to mitigate by accepting
other employment should not be penalized by being forced to return to a job from which
he was wrongfully discharged in order to regain fully his former salary. If the plaintiff's
acceptance of the other job is the only factor precluding reinstatement, however, this view
seems to conflict with the Supreme Court's ruling in a Title VII case, Ford Motor Co. v.
EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, (1982), that a reinstatement offer by an employer cuts off back pay
liability. Id. at 230-34. This analysis would seem to impose a similar obligation on a
plaintiff to accept reinstatement after a successful ADEA suit if no other factors dis-
cussed in this section preclude his return to his old position. See O'Donnell v. Georgia
Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 748 F.2d 1543, 1550 (1Ith Cir. 1984) ("unreasonably refused
offer of reinstatement will preclude recovery of front pay and back pay"). See supra notes
100-05, infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
There may be cases, however, in which an offer of reinstatement is not bona fide. See
O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 214, 221 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(defendant claimed an offer of reinstatement was made but court held it was "not clear
that [such an offer] was actually made"), affd in part, rev'd in part, 748 F.2d 1543, 1551-
52 (1Ith Cir. 1984) (back pay and front pay award reversed; remanded for reconsidera-
tion of reinstatement offers). The legitimacy of a reinstatement offer should be an element
of proof open to the plaintiff in a request for front pay in lieu of reinstatement. See supra
notes 104-05 and accompanying text. Cf Front Pay Remedy, supra note 45, at 5 (sug-
gesting that employers may keep reinstatement open "as a viable alternative in order to
make a claim for front pay less compelling").
107. See Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984); Gibson
v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100-01 (8th Cir. 1982); Cleverly v. Western
Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638, 641-42 (8th Cir. 1979); Chern v. Ogden Food Serv. Corp., 33
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1547, 1548 (E.D. Pa. 1984); see also Houghton v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 627 F.2d 858, 866-67 (8th Cir. 1980) (reinstatement denied because
of valid determination after trial that test pilot was no longer qualified for service).
108. See Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc. 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984); Chern v.
Ogden Food Serv. Corp., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1547, 1548 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
109. Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., No. 79-241, slip op. at 6 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 18,
1982), afl'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1984).
110. See Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638, 641-42 (8th Cir. 1979); see also
Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 627 F.2d 858, 863-66 (8th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff
denied reinstatement because he would have been legitimately unqualified for the position
at the time of trial); cf Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233, 238 (6th Cir. 1983) (back pay
award under Title VII limited to date plaintiff's position was eliminated); Welch v. Uni-
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Under this view, the probability that the plaintiff's .position will be elimi-
nated after trial would not alone justify an award of front pay in lieu of
reinstatment.'11 This appears to be the better view. The elimination of
the plaintiff's position through a post-judgment reduction in force should
not justify an award of front pay if reinstatement is otherwise appropri-
ate. 12 Reinstatement and an award of back pay are sufficient to make a
plaintiff whole because elimination of his position will occur irrespective
of the unlawful discharge. Even if it is determined that reinstatement is
not appropriate because of other circumstances such as those discussed
above," 3 the defendant should have the opportunity to show that a fu-
ture good faith reduction in force limits his front pay liability." 4 The
defendant's liability for front pay should not extend beyond the time at
which the plaintiff's position would have been eliminated through a good
faith reduction in force. 1 5
These situations illustrate the variety of circumstances in which rein-
statement is an inappropriate remedy. Denial of reinstatement without a
front pay award, however, leads to an unjust result: The plaintiff is not
restored to the position he would have held but for the discrimination, 6
and the employer is not deterred from future wrongful acts. 17 Thus,
unless front pay is permitted, the Act's specific goal of making the plain-
versity of Texas & Its Marine Science Inst., 659 F.2d 531, 535 (5th Cir. 1981) (damage
award under Title VII limited to date plaintiff's grant expired).
111. See Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 924 (6th Cir. 1984)
(Weliford, J., dissenting).
112. See id.
113. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
114. In Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1085,
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), affld, 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984), evidence was accepted on the plain-
tiff's future earnings had he remained with Union Carbide. Id. at 1086. Defendants
should be able to introduce similar evidence predicting probable reductions in force in
which the plaintiff would likely be discharged for permissible business reasons. See Gib-
son v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (8th Cir. 1982) (defendant argued
that plaintiff's position had been eliminated and that he would have been permissibly
discharged before trial; remanded for consideration of this issue by jury). Reductions in
force must meet two tests in order to justify forced early retirement of workers protected
by the ADEA. EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 733 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1984). "First,
the necessity for drastic cost reductions. .. must be real .... Second, the forced early
retirement must be the least-detrimental-alternative means available to reduce costs." Id.
115. "The ADEA was not intended to insulate workers from the problems of a strug-
gling company in a difficult and uncertain economy and the probability of layoffs or even
plant closing." Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 924 (6th Cir. 1984)
(Wellford, J., dissenting).
116. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984); EEOC
v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated on
other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison
Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteo-
pathic Hosp., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 214, 222 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (plaintiff's inability to find
substitute work given as one reason for front pay award), aff'd in part, rey'd in part on
other grounds, 748 F.2d 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (remanded for reconsideration of validity
of reinstatement offer). See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
117. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984); EEOC
v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated on
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tiff whole and its general purpose of deterring discrimination are
thwarted.
B. Front Pay and the Statutory Mandate for Conciliation
The ADEA requires that efforts at conciliation precede any litigation
under the Act. "I Although courts have differed on how exhaustive con-
ciliation efforts must be, 119 the conciliation process has remained a cen-
tral part of the ADEA and a prerequisite to any suit. 120 Opponents of
front pay argue that the plaintiff will be less likely to conciliate if there is
a possibility of a large front pay award.' 2 ' It is claimed that this effect
thwarts the congressional mandate for conciliation and unduly improves
the plaintiff's bargaining position during the conciliation process. 22
This view does not stand up to scrutiny. If a plaintiff holds out during
conciliation proceedings in the hope that he will recover front pay in
litigation, his hope is quite speculative. Statistics indicate that he has a
good chance of losing on the discrimination issue.' 23 Even if he wins,
however, the court may rule that reinstatement is more appropriate;12
the plaintiff has thus gained no financial benefit by proceeding to litiga-
tion. Because a plaintiff who resists conciliation in hope of a front pay
windfall must gamble on favorable judgments on both the liability and
front pay issues, and because there are few fact situations in which front
pay is likely to be awarded, z5 this "hold-out" possibility appears
remote. 12
6
The argument that front pay will undermine conciliation is based on
the assumption that absent the possibility of a front pay award, an equi-
other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison
Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
120. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
121. See MacGill v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1254, 1259
(D. Md. 1983); Ginsberg v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 696, 701 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Jaffee v. Plough Broadcasting Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1194, 1195 (D.
Md. 1979); Mader v. Control Data Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1192, 1193
(D. Md. 1978); cf Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 687 (7th Cir.) (effects on
conciliation discussed in denying damages for pain and suffering), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1039 (1982). See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 121.
123. See Schuster & Miller, An Empirical Assessment of the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act, 38 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev., Oct. 1984, at 64, 71. (employers win 64% of
litigated ADEA cases on discrimination issue).
124. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
125. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1984) (front
pay appropriate in "limited circumstances"); Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d
916, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1984) (front pay may not be appropriate in all cases).
126. One court has suggested that restricting damages to back pay may encourage
employees to delay the judgment date because their award depends on the length of time
between discharge and trial. See Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161,
1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Availability of front pay would reduce this incentive to delay. See
id.
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librium exists between the parties in terms of their motivation to concili-
ate. 127 Several factors, however, suggest that regardless of the possibility
of front pay awards, employers hold superior bargaining power during
the conciliation process. First, most plaintiffs are not likely to obtain
representation by the EEOC because it concentrates its efforts on concili-
ation 128 and brings few suits under the ADEA. 29 Second, ADEA plain-
tiffs have only a limited chance of recovery. 30 Third, such plaintiffs are
likely to be aware of the substantial resources most employers can devote
to litigation should conciliation fail.13 ' Finally, the possibility of a sub-
stantially reduced award due to mitigation 3 2 should make it apparent to
plaintiffs that they are unlikely to receive a front pay windfall.' 33
C. Front Pay and the Problem of Speculation
There are two areas of speculation inherent in the determination of a
front pay award: the plaintiff's future had he remained at his old job"
and his probable earnings in alternative employment. 35 Although future
damages are more difficult to determine than back pay, 136 this problem
should not preclude implementation of a necessary remedy.'3' That un-
certainty of amount should not deprive the plaintiff of a damage award
has been established by a line of Supreme Court and lower court cases in
127. The view that a remedy not previously available will tip the scales toward plain-
tiffs is the basis for the argument that an award of front pay will frustrate the congres-
sional mandate to conciliate. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
129. In 1984, the EEOC litigated in 63 ADEA cases and in 1983 half that number.
Middleton, Age Discrimination Awards Surge, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 8, col. 1. In
1983, the EEOC filed suit in a total of 191 cases under the ADEA, Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act. EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 67, at 5 (Sept. 1984). The EEOC re-
ceived 15,303 charges under the ADEA alone in 1983. Data from EEOC to appear in
EEOC Annual Report, 1983 (available in files of Fordham Lav Resiew).
130. See supra note 123.
131. See du Fresne, Is There Compensation for Litigation of Age Discrimination? Yes!,
55 Fla. Bar J. 200, 200 (1981) ("The purpose of attorney's fees awards in age discrimina-
tion cases is to involve competent, experienced members of the bar in the litigation of
these plaintiffs' demands. Certainly the employer/defendant will engage such counsel to
defend."). Most corporations have extensive legal departments. See The National Law
Journal, Directory of the Legal Profession 1067-85 (1984). Some corporate legal depart-
ments include substantial staff devoted exclusively to labor and EEOC litigation. For
example, E.I. Du Pont has a staff of ten labor lawyers, id. at 1076, the Greyhound Corpo-
ration includes among its senior positions the positions of Chief Labor Counsel and Assis-
tant Labor Counsel, id. at 1079, and Pfizer's legal department lists EEO suits as among
its full service areas, id. at 1084.
132. See infra notes 151, 199-214 and accompanying text.
133. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728-29 (2d Cir. 1984);
Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
134. See infra notes 187-98 and accompanying text
135. See infra notes 199-214 and accompanying text.
136. See Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F. 2d 1473, 1481 (10th Cir.) (Seth, J., dissent-
ing) (front pay may be speculative), cert denied, 105 S. CL 133 (1984); Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1023 (1st Cir. 1979) (same).
137. Section IV.B.2. of this Note discusses methods for reducing speculativeness in
front pay awards. See infra notes 173-214 and accompanying text.
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a variety of contexts.13 s The principle behind these decisions is that a
wrongdoer should not escape liability because the exact amount of dam-
ages may be difficult to compute, 139 a rationale that fully applies to front
pay under the ADEA. 14
Some courts have regarded ADEA actions as identical to common law
breach of contract suits for back wages. 141 One such court has held that
because such a suit requires proof of all damages, the speculative nature
of front pay precludes its use as an ADEA remedy.' 42 Rather than pre-
cluding front pay, however, this contract theory supports its use in cer-
tain cases.1 43 Proof of future damages is routinely admitted in breach of
employment contract cases. Similarly, future damages are an accepted
remedy in wrongful discharge actions in states in which such actions are
considered to be contractual. 144 Because proof of future damages is ac-
ceptable in common law cases based on contract principles, it should be
permitted in ADEA cases when they are analyzed under such princi-
ples.' 45 Although such proof may not be sufficient to rebut the assertion
138. See J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566-67 (1981)
(antitrust); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 124-25 (1969)
(same); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1946) (same); Palmer v.
Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 311 U.S. 544, 559 (1941) (damages for rejection of
lease); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562-63
(1931) (antitrust); Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Ry. Co., 173 U.S. 1, 16 (1899)
(breach of employment contract); Hetzel v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 169 U.S. 26, 37-38
(1898) (damage to land); Donovan v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 722 F.2d 397, 404
(8th Cir. 1983) (FLSA), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 290 (1984); Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (patents); Inland Container, Inc. v. United
States, 512 F.2d 1073, 1082 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (breach of contract).
139. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1946).
140. See EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir.
1984), vacated on other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985); Koyen v. Con-
solidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
141. See Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 871-72 (1st Cir. 1982); Rogers v. Exxon
Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 838 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022
(1978).
142. The court in Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1982), first used its
contract analysis to limit back pay awards to those damages actually proven, thus deny-
ing prospective wage increases for which no evidence had been introduced. See id. at
872-73. The court then extended its limitation on damages to a general denial of front
pay. See id. at 874 n.4.
143. See, e.g., Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Ry. Co., 173 U.S. 1, 16 (1899); Budge
v. Post, 643 F.2d 372, 375-76 (5th Cir. 1981); Dixie Glass Co. v. Pollack, 341 S.W.2d
530, 538 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); see J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 14-
18, at 544 & n.46 (2d ed. 1977); C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages § 158
(1935).
144. See Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, 422 N.E.2d 1379, 1385-87 (Mass.
App. 1981); Rudman v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 1, 14, 280 N.E.2d 867,
874, 330 N.Y.S.2d 33, 43 (1972); cf Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557, 558
(Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (future damages awarded for retaliatory discharge under workers'
compensation laws).
145. Cf Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 871-72 (Ist Cir. 1982). The Kolb analy-
sis of the ADEA as contractual led to the conclusion that damages must be proven.
Future damages, if proven, may therefore be supported under this analysis.
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of speculativeness in a particular case,'" the future projections involved
in the computation of a front pay award should not bar the use of the
remedy in appropriate cases. 47
The main difference between ADEA and breach of employment con-
tract actions is the possibly open-ended nature of an ADEA award.'4
Cases denying front pay stress a "worst case" scenario in which plaintiffs
in their forties or fifties could receive huge front pay awards. 4 9 The pos-
sibility of extreme situations, however, "does not warrant denial of relief
in appropriate cases."' 50 Moreover, windfall front pay awards for
younger plaintiffs who are clearly reemployable would be limited by an
increased mitigation deduction. 51 Further, courts awarding front pay
have emphasized that it is not a per se remedy 52 and should be used with
discretion.5 3 They would be reluctant to exercise their equitable powers
to grant a huge front pay award to a young plaintiff.'
These policy considerations indicate that the availability of front pay
under the ADEA complements rather than contravenes Congress' goals
of making the plaintiff whole and deterring future age discrimination. 55
In order to demonstrate that front pay is a viable addition or alternative
146. Because the plaintiff still bears the burden of proving future losses, speculative-
ness will defeat or reduce future damages in any area of the law if insufficient proof is
offered. See Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 429 F.2d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 1970), cert
denied, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971); see also Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. 327 U.S. 251,
264 (1946) ("[T]he jury may not render a verdict based on speculation or guesswork.");
cf. D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 8.1, at 541-42 (1973) (reasonable
certainty required in proof of lost profits). Failure of proof in an ADEA case would thus
defeat a future damage award.
147. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984); Davis
v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Prudential Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 53
U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp.
1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). But see Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 582 F. Supp. 80,
84 (D.P.R. 1984) (speculative nature of front pay bars its use).
148. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1984) (ADEA
award may extend to the projected retirement date of the plaintiff); Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1003, 1023 & n.34 (Ist Cir. 1979) (ADEA front pay awards may extend to the
projected retirement date of the plaintiff.). Future damages for breach of contract are
limited to the duration of the contract. See D. Dobbs, supra note 146, § 12.25, at 924-25.
149. See, e.g., Helwig v. Suburban Chevrolet, Inc., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1261, 1267 (D. Md. 1983); Foit v. Suburban Bancorp., 549 F. Supp. 264, 267 (D. Md.
1982); Covey v. Robert A. Johnston Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1188, 1191 (D.
Md. 1977); Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
150. Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
151. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984); EEOC
v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated on
other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985); Koyen v. Consolidated Edision
Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See supra notes 209, 214 and accom-
panying text.
152. See Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922 (6th Cir. 1984).
153. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1984); Davis
v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1984).
154. See Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984).
155. See supra notes 31, 32 and accompanying text.
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to other remedies under the ADEA, an examination of front pay's imple-
mentation is necessary.
IV. GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING FRONT PAY
Parts II and III of this Note have concluded that front pay is an ap-
propriate remedy in light of the ADEA's language, legislative history
and underlying policies. Part IV examines issues involving front pay's
interaction with other ADEA remedies and considers approaches to
avoiding speculativeness in front pay awards.
A. The Interaction of Front Pay and Other Remedies
1. Front Pay and a Request for Reinstatement
Some courts have held that a request for reinstatement is a necessary
precondition to a front pay award. 156 Others, however, have held that a
plaintiff's failure to request reinstatement does not result in a waiver of
his right to front pay. 157 The second view is more consistent with the
ADEA's purposes. Under the first view, a plaintiff who is unlawfully
discharged must seek reinstatement even though he believes that it is in-
appropriate.158 Rather than compelling such a plaintiff to maintain the
fiction that he desires reinstatement, he should be given the opportunity
to prove in his request for front pay that reinstatement is not appropri-
ate.' 59 A plaintiff who would as a last resort accept reinstatement were
front pay not available should be given the opportunity to seek both rem-
edies in the alternative.'6 This approach will give the court better gui-
156. See, e.g., Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283-84 (3d Cir. 1980); Ventura
v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp. 48, 50 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Monroe v. Penn-Dixie
Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971); see H. Eglit, supra note 10,
§ 18.13, at 18-57.
157. See, e.g., EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1232 n.2
(10th Cir. 1984) (citing Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th Cir.
1980)), vacated on other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985); Koyen v. Con-
solidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); O'Donnell v. Georgia
Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 214, 219, 222 (N.D. Ga. 1982), affid in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 748 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984); cf Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stock-
ade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th Cir. 1980) (failure to request reinstatement not fatal in
Title VII case).
158. If front pay were not available "an employer could avoid the purpose of the Act
simply by making reinstatement so unattractive and infeasible that the wronged employee
would not want to return." EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225,
1232 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985);
see Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319-20 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 859 (1982); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1169
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
159. See O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 214, 222 (N.D.
Ga. 1983), afl'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 748 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984)
(remanded for reconsideration of whether reinstatement was more appropriate than front
pay); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
160. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp, 567 F. Supp. 1320, 1331 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
affd, 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984); Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., No. 79-241, slip op.
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dance in exercising its equitable discretion to award front pay than would
a rule requiring all plaintiffs to make a pro forma request for
reinstatement.
2. Front Pay and Liquidated Damages
Liquidated damages are an amount equal to the plaintiff's back pay
award and can provide a net award to the plaintiff of twice the amount of
back pay. 161 Courts are in disagreement about the relationship between
these damages and front pay awards. Some courts have held that
although front pay may be an appropriate ADEA remedy, it should not
be awarded if there is a substantial liquidated damages award.1 62 These
courts have reasoned that such an award is sufficient to fulfill front pay's
function of making the plaintiff whole. 163 Under another view, however,
front pay is included in the liquidated damages award so that the plaintiff
receives a net award equal to a doubling of front and back pay.'64
A third and better view regards front pay and liquidated damages in-
dependently. 165 Liquidated damages are of a punitive nature and are
at 6 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 1982), affid in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 742 F.2d 916
(6th Cir. 1984).
161. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
162. See Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Robb v. Chemetron Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1535, 1545-46 (S.D. Tex. 1978); see also Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1023 n.3
(1st Cir. 1979) ("availability of a substantial liquidated damages award under the ADEA
may be a proper consideration in denying additional damages in lieu of reinstatement").
163. See Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1319-20 (9th Cir.), cerL
denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Robb v. Chemetron Corp., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1535, 1545 (S.D. Tex. 1978); see also Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1023 n.35 (1st
Cir. 1979) (though not equating front pay with liquidated damages, noted that a substan-
tial liquidated damages award may provide a rationale for denying damages in lieu of
reinstatement).
164. See Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 496 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. Okla. 1980), affid in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 731 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 233
(1984).
165. See O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 214, 223 (N.D.
Ga. 1983), affid in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 748 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984).
The district court in O'Donnell awarded liquidated damages because the jury found that
the hospital's violation of the ADEA was willful and because the court found that the
hospital presented insufficient evidence of good faith. 574 F. Supp. at 222-23. See supra
note 24. The court ruled, however, that doubling both back pay and front pay was inap-
propriate in computing liquidated damages. Id. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the liqui-
dated damages award in O'Donnell after concluding that the case should be remanded for
reconsideration whether the plaintiff unreasonably refused an offer of reinstatement. 748
F.2d at 1551. A finding by the district court on remand that the plaintiff unreasonably
rejected a reinstatement offer would cut off all of the front pay award and back pay dating
from the offer of reinstatement until the trial. Such a finding would reduce the amount of
the liquidated damages award because these damages are awarded in an amount equal to
back pay, see supra notes 7, 22-23 and accompanying text, and if back pay is reduced,
liquidated damages would be commensurately reduced. It is assumed that the liquidated
damages determination will be made on remand in light of the standards for liquidated
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awarded only in the event of willful violations. 66 As part of the
ADEA's legal relief they may be determined by a jury. 167 Front pay is
awarded only if a judge in the exercise of his equitable discretion deter-
mines that monetary damages are more appropriate than reinstate-
ment.1 68 Front pay should therefore be unaffected by a liquidated
damages award.' 69 A substantial liquidated damages award should not
be viewed as a "cure" for the assertedly speculative nature of a front pay
award. 70 Although separate treatment of the two remedies may lead to
substantial recoveries for plaintiffs whose discharge was willful and who
are entitled to front pay,17 1 this approach does avoid the extremely large
awards caused by doubling both back and front pay.' 72
damages delineated by the Supreme Court in TWA v. Thurston, 53 U.S.L.W. 4024, 4027(U.S. Jan. 8, 1985). See supra note 24. In any event, the Eleventh Circuit in O'Donnell
does not seem to be questioning the district court's analysis of front pay and liquidated
.damages as separate and independent remedies.
166. See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 53 U.S.L.W. 4024, 4027 (U.S. Jan. 8,
1985); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
167. See H.R. Rep. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (conference report on 1978
amendments), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 528, 535; 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(c) (1982).
168. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984); Davis
v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Prudential
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds,
53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp.
1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
169. See O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 214, 223 (N.D.
Ga. 1983), affid in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 748 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
See supra note 165 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's decision in Trans
World Airlines v. Thurston, 53 U.S.L.W. 4024 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1985), lends support to this
view. The Court's statement that liquidated damages are punitive, id. at 4027, further
distinguishes these damages from front pay, the award of which is not dependent on a
willful violation of the act. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 726-28
(2d Cir. 1984) (front pay awarded in the case of a nonwillful violation).
170. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1023 (1st Cir. 1979). See supra note
162 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 918 (6th Cir. 1984)
(award of $22,000 in back pay, $20,000 in liquidated damages and $88,800 in front pay
for six years until retirement date); O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 574 F.
Supp. 214, 222-23 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (award of $18,991.70 in back pay, an equal amount in
liquidated damages, and $51,577.29 in front pay to cover a four year period until ex-
pected retirement), affid in part, rev'd in part, 748 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984).
172. See Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 496 F. Supp. 818, 821 (W.D. Okl. 1980), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 731 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 233(1984). In Blim, the district court awarded front pay consisting of expected lost wages
after demotion of the plaintiffs. One plaintiff was awarded $127,851.60 after doubling of
both front pay and back pay awards. His front pay award alone, however, was $6,115.84
for approximately seven months until his expected retirement. Another plaintiff with
eight years until retirement was awarded front pay of $20,091.41 and a total award of
$119,438.28 after both back pay and front pay were doubled. The front pay awards were
rendered moot, however, when the Tenth Circuit found that repromotion was more ap-
propriate. Blim, 731 F.2d at 1479.
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B. Approaches to Avoiding Speculativeness in Front Pay Awards
1. Lump Sum Awards and Periodic Payments
The general practice in most cases involving future damages has been
to award plaintiffs a lump sum based on expected earnings less a mitiga-
tion factor. 73 There is, however, some authority for the use of periodic
rather than lump sum payments.174 Under a periodic payment system,
the plaintiff's award would be reevaluated at periodic intervals and ad-
justed according to the degree to which he has fulfilled his duty to miti-
gate.175 Proponents of this view argue that it provides a more realistic
approximation of the future needs of the plaintiff and decreases the spec-
ulation inherent in lump sum awards.176
The continuing jurisdiction inherent in the use of periodic payments,
however, may place an undue burden on the courts. 177 Periodic reevalu-
ation could lead to a multiplication of litigation' 8 in an era in which
court calendars are already overcrowded. 179 The burden of such contin-
uing litigation would also fall more heavily on plaintiffs than on defend-
ants, because whereas defendants usually maintain legal staffs that
conduct ADEA litigation, 80 plaintiffs may have difficulty in obtaining
counsel for maintenance of their awards.' 8 ' In any case, because it is not
likely that lump sum awards will be abandoned for another system in the
173. See D. Dobbs, supra note 146, §§ 8.1, 8.7, 8.9, at 54041, 551, 570-75, 579-81;
Page, Impairment of Earning Capacity, in Damages in Personal Injury and Wrongful
Death Cases 447, 449 (S. Schreiber ed. 1965); Elligett, The Periodic Payment of Judg-
ments, 46 Insurance Couns. J. 130 (1979); Rea, Lump-Sum Versus Periodic Damage
Awards, 10 J. Legal Stud. 131 (1981).
174. See Elligett, supra note 173, at 130-31; Rea, supra note 173, at 131-33.
175. See Elligett, supra note 173, at 139; Rea, supra note 173, at 131-32; Note, Variable
Periodic Payments of Damages. An Alternative to Lump Sum Awards, 64 Iowa L Rev.
138, 139 n.17 (1978).
176. See infra note 177. The court in Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d
257 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976), a Title VII case, suggested as an alterna-
tive to a lump sum award that the court maintain jurisdiction over the case during a
series of periodic back pay awards until the plaintiffs were repromoted. Id. at 269. A
similar relitigable award was proposed in Valcourt v. Hyland, 503 F. Supp. 630, 636 (D.
Mass. 1980), a case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
177. See Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1340-41 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd,
466 F.2d 1226 (1972); see also Heheman v. E.W. Scripps Co., 661 F.2d 1115, 1125 (6th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982) (courts are poorly suited to supervise em-
ployer-employee relationship over plaintiff's lifetime).
178. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1085,
1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affid, 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984); Frankel v. United States, 321
F. Supp. 1331, 1340-41 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aft'd, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972); Rea, supra
note 173, at 144.
179. See Lasker, The Court Crunch. A View From the Bench, 76 F.R.D. 245, 246
(speech delivered at 1977 meeting of the Federal Bar Council); Mills, Caseload Explosion"
The Appellate Response, 16 J. Mar. L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (1982).
180. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
181. Cf Rea, supra note 173, at 146 (noting lawyers' concern that contingent fee might
not be received as a reason why periodic payments are not widespread).
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near future, 8' it is useful to examine the sources of uncertainty in lump
sum front pay awards under the ADEA.
2. Uncertainty and Front Pay Awards
The two sources of uncertainty in front pay awards are the plaintiff's
future at his old job had he not been discharged' and his probable earn-
ings in alternative employment. 84 That these uncertainties should not
bar the use of front pay under the ADEA has previously been dis-
cussed.' This section considers methods of minimizing such uncertain-
ties in computing front pay awards. Use of such methods in ADEA
cases thus far has indicated that courts are able to avoid the pitfalls of
uncertainty in granting equitable front pay awards.'8 6
a. Plaintiffs Future At His Old Job
A plaintiff's future at a job had the discrimination not occurred can
never be precisely predicted.'87 Whether promotions,' 88 demotions, 89
182. See Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1340-41 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd,
466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972); see also Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 35 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1085, 1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (refusal to order periodic evaluation),
affid, 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984). The majority view in breach of employment contracts
is that an employee may recover for his prospective loss for the unexpired period of un-
employment. See D. Dobbs, supra note 146, § 12.25, at 924; C. McCormick, supra note
143, § 161.
183. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1023 (1st Cir. 1979).
184. See EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir.
1984), vacated on other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985); Koyen v. Con-
solidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1167-69; Crawford & McRae, Front Pay in
Lieu of Reinstatement as a Remedy in ADEA Litigation, 9 Employee Rel. L.J. 705, 708
(1984).
185. See supra notes 134-54 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1085, 1087-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (plaintiff awarded $93,000 salary at time of termination
plus other benefits, less $25,000 deduction for mitigation for each of four years until
retirement), affid, 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984); Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., No. 79-
241, slip op. at 5-6 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 1982) (plaintiff awarded a total of $88,200 over
a six year period until retirement), aff'd, 742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1984); O'Donnell v.
Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 214, 222 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (plaintiff
awarded a total of $51,577.29 to cover four year period until retirement date), affid in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 748 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984); Koyen v. Consoli-
dated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (plaintiff awarded total of
$60,107 for 23 month period until expected retirement); Ventura v. Federal Life Ins. Co.,
571 F. Supp. 48, 50-51 (N.D. II1. 1983) (award of vested pension rights); cf. Folz v.
Marriott Corp., No. 82-0219 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 31, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (in ERISA case, plaintiff awarded $85,443 to cover difference in salary
between old and new job over seven year period until retirement).
187. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984); EEOC
v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1235 (10th Cir. 1984) (Barrett, J.,
dissenting), vacated on other grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985); Loeb v.
Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1023 (1st Cir. 1979).
188. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1023 (1st Cir. 1979).
189. See EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1235 (10th Cir.
1984) (Barrett, J., dissenting) (quoting Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1481
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layoffs19° or terminations' 9' would have taken place are sources of uncer-
tainty. Nonetheless, personnel experts can make reasonably accurate
predictions about the plaintiff's probable future in a job.192 For example,
patterns of wage increases before trial can be extrapolated into the fu-
ture;193 defendants might attempt to prove that severe reductions in force
that would clearly abolish the plaintiff's job title are almost certain to
occur in the near future; 94 and plaintiffs might attempt to prove that
substantial advancement in their old job was likely.' The courts can
also rely on their experience in determining damages in wrongful dis-
charge1 96 and breach of contract actions 97 when calculating ADEA
front pay awards.' 9 8
b. Plaintiff's Probable Earnings in Alternative Employment
In breach of employment contract cases, courts have reduced awards
by a mitigation factor equal to amounts an employee has earned or may
be expected to earn in an alternative position.' 99 There are two views
regarding the plaintiff's duty to mitigate in these cases. Under the ma-
jority rule, the plaintiff has a duty to accept employment of the same or
similar character.2' ° If the plaintiff has been unable to secure such em-
(10th Cir.) (Seth, J. dissenting), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984)), vacated on other
grounds, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985).
190. See Crawford & McRae, supra note 184, at 708.
191. See Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473, 1481 (10th Cir.) (Seth, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 233 (1984).
192. See Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., No. 79-241, slip op. at 2-3 (E.D. Tenn. July
6, 1982) (front pay award based on testimony of Professor of Management and Marketing
at the University of Tennessee), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 742 F.2d 916
(6th Cir. 1984); Crawford & McRae, supra note 184, at 708.
193. See Folz v. Marriott Corp., No. 82-0219 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 31, 1984) (available on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee at 26-27, Davis v. Com-
bustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1984).
194. See Crawford & McRae, supra note 184, at 708 ("Expert testimony on relevant
labor market conditions, the plaintiff's health, foreseeable layoffs or plant closures, and
similar issues all appear relevant to the inquiry into whether the front pay award would
be speculative or a windfall.").
195. See supra note 193. Cf. Johnson v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 1039, 1044-45 (D.
Mont. 1981) (courts may consider plaintiff's future earning power in determining dam-
ages in FTCA case), a.ffd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 704 F.2d 143 (9th Cir.
1983); see generally Lawless, Computation of Future Damages A Viev From the Bench,
54 Geo. LJ. 1131, 1133 (courts often consider plaintiffs' prospects for advancement ab-
sent an injury).
196. See supra note 144.
197. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1984). See
supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
199. See Katch v. Speidel, Div. of Textron, Inc., 746 F.2d 1136, 1138 (6th Cir. 1984);
Heheman v. E.W. Scripps Co., 661 F.2d 1115, 1125 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
991 (1982); Hollwedel v. Duffy-Mott Co., 263 N.Y. 95, 101, 188 N.E. 266, 268 (1933); D.
Dobbs, supra note 146, § 12.25, at 925; McCormick, supra note 143, § 160.
200. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 143, § 14-18, at 544; see Parker v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 181-84, 474 P.2d 689, 692 (1970); Seco Chems.,
Inc. v. Stewart, 169 Ind. App. 624, 636, 349 N.E.2d 733, 740-41 (1976); see also Ford
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ployment, his award is not reduced.20 Under the minority rule, if he has
been unable to find employment of the same character and grade within a
reasonable time, the plaintiff must accept other employment for which he
is fit.2 0 2
The majority rule is more appropriate in ADEA front pay cases.203
Under the minority rule, a plaintiff would be awarded only the difference
between his expected salary at his old job and that of the "employment
• ..for which he [is] fitted. ' 2°4 Such employment, however, may have
much lower status and job satisfaction than did the plaintiff's old job.20 5
Forcing a plaintiff to accept such employment to regain his former salary
would thwart the ADEA's purpose of making plaintiffs whole.20 6 The
majority view should be applied cautiously, however, particularly in
Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1981) ("[T]he unemployed or underemployed
claimant need not go into another line of work, accept a demotion, or take a demeaning
position . . ").
201. See Ballard v. El Dorado Tire Co., 512 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1975); D. Dobbs,
supra note 146, § 12.25, at 925-26. See generally Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 629, 640-41 (1972)
(discussion of general rule that wrongfully discharged employees have a duty to mitigate
only by accepting employment of the same or similar character as that from which they
were discharged).
202. See Perry v. Simpson Waterproof Mfg. Co., 37 Conn. 520, 540 (1871); Torson
Constr. Co. v. Grant, 251 Ky. 800, 806, 66 S.W.2d 79, 82 (1933); Simon v. Allen & Co.,
76 Tex. 398, 399, 13 S.W. 296, 296 (1890); Copeland v. Hill, 126 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1939); Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 629, 641 & n.15 (1972). Even under the majority
view, if the plaintiff has accepted prior to judgment a job of different or similar character,
plaintiff's back pay and future damage award will be reduced by, respectively, amounts he
has earned and will earn in that job. D. Dobbs, supra note 146, § 12.25, at 926. The
purposes of the Act seem to be thwarted, however, by requiring a plaintiff who has won
an ADEA suit and mitigated his damages at a job with lower status and/or salary to
continue at that job after trial in order to earn his full former salary. Such a requirement
would be an affront to the plaintiff's previous status and may limit his chances of regain-
ing a job similar to his old position. See infra notes 205-06, 212-14 and accompanying
text.
203. In determining the mitigation deduction for back pay awards under the ADEA,
courts have followed the majority rule by not requiring plaintiffs to accept jobs that are
not comparable to the job from they which they were discharged. See, e.g., EEOC v.
Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 627 (10th Cir. 1980); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F.
Supp. 706, 712 (E.D. Wis. 1978). The same rationale should apply to front pay awards.
Cf. NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307, 1320-21 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (victim of
discrimination in NLRB case not required to accept unsuitable employment).
204. Copeland v. Hill, 126 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) (quoting Simon v.
Allen, 76 Tex. 398, 399, 13 S.W. 296, 296 (1890)).
205. Cf. Green v. Kaynar Mfg. Co., 369 F.2d 375, 376 (9th Cir. 1966) (executive
would not be required to accept job doing "menial work"); Ingrassia v. Shell Oil Co., 394
F. Supp. 875, 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (wrongfully discharged employee has no duty to
mitigate by accepting a job of reduced rank); 2 H. Eglit, supra note 10, § 18.12, at 18-49
(plaintiff not required to accept a job not comparable to previous job in mitigation of back
pay award). See generally Annot., 44 A.L.R. 3d 629, 668-71 (1972) (executives not re-
quired to accept lower ranking position in mitigation of damages for wrongful discharge).
206. A plaintiff's acceptance of a lower status position may jeopardize his future. His
apparent demotion may make prospective employers suspicious. In wrongful discharge
cases, an employee is not obligated to accept a position that would injure his future ca-
reer. See American Trading Co. v. Steele, 274 F. 774, 783 (9th Cir. 1921).
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ADEA cases involving younger plaintiffs.2 ' 7 It might result in larger
awards for a plaintiff whose high position before discharge makes it un-
likely that he will immediately obtain a position of the same or similar
character.20 8 When the plaintiff is relatively young, however, it is more
likely that he will in time be able to regain such a position. These
awards, therefore, should be limited in time according to the plaintiff's
chances of regaining his former status quickly.' 9
It is possible, however, that the only way for such a plaintiff to regain a
former high position may be to accept a lower paying job and seek ad-
vancement.210 If this plaintiff acquires such a job after trial, however,
under the majority view's rationale he would be receiving not only the
front pay award fully covering his former salary but also the salary from
his new job. It may be argued that he thereby would be made more than
whole.2 1  This argument, however, fails to consider the nonsalary aspects
of the process of making a plaintiff whole.212 For example, an executive
207. See Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984) (award of
front pay through retirement to a discriminatorily discharged 41 year old may be
unwarranted).
208. Cf. Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1085,
1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Chief Labor Counsel found not likely to regain similar position
before retirement), affid, 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984).
209. Cf. Crawford & McRae, supra note 184, at 708 (factors favorable to a plaintiff,
such as bright employment prospects, would serve to reduce, but not eliminate, a front
pay award).
ADEA front pay awards for younger plaintiffs would be analagous to most front pay
awards under Title VII: They would last for a limited period of time until the plaintiff
regains his rightful place. See EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 927
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (court ordered front pay after estimating that a plaintiff could within a
year secure similar employment), affld mer., 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 920 (1977); see also EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 634 F.2d 1273, 1282 (10th Cir.
1980) (Title VII plaintiffs awarded front pay until rightful place secured), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 986 (1981). See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
210. See Rones, supra note 44, at 10 (studies show a decline in status and salary for
older displaced workers and retirees who return to work). See supra notes 44, 45 and
accompanying text. A successful ADEA plaintiff may encounter additional difficulties in
obtaining employment because of his notoriety as a victorious litigant. Although it could
be argued that an employer's failure to hire him because of this constitutes another
ADEA violation, proof of such a violation would be much more difficult to obtain than
proof of unlawful discharge. Furthermore, a successful plaintiff should not be forced con-
tinually to resort to the courts because of his success.
211. Cf. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1977)
(compensatory damages for pain and suffering and punitive damages go beyond the statu-
tory scheme of making plaintiffs whole), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978). Front pay,
however, as the monetary equivalent of the equitable remedy of reinstatement, see supra
note 213 and accompanying text, is distinguishable from the legal remedies of pain and
suffering or punitive damages which have been rejected by most circuits. See supra notes
36-39 and accompanying text. It is awarded only in limited circumstances when rein-
statement is inappropriate. See supra notes 96-115 and accompanying text.
212. "[T]hat which makes people whole is a matter for the discretion of the trial court
under the facts and circumstances of the individual case." Davis v. Combustion Eng'g,
Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d
1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1982)).
The legislative history of the ADEA includes much evidence of concern by supporters
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forced after trial to advance from a lower position suffers from his reduc-
tion in status and the necessity to repeat the promotional steps he under-
took to gain his previous high position.213 A front pay award that is
limited to a realistic assessment of the time necessary for reaccession of
the plaintiff to a job of the same or similar character as his old job would
not go beyond the remedial purposes of the ADEA even if during that
period the plaintiff recovers more than his previous salary.2 14
CONCLUSION
The ADEA's remedies were designed to further the purposes of the
Act by making unlawfully discharged workers whole and by deterring
future discriminatory acts by employers. A back pay award and rein-
statement are the preferred remedies to achieve these goals. In some
cases, however, there may be factors that preclude reinstatement and
make the alternate remedy of front pay appropriate.
Front pay in lieu of reinstatement need not b6 a speculative remedy if
courts in the exercise of their equitable discretion carefully weigh the
plaintiff's probable future at his former job and his duty to mitigate by
seeking alternative employment. Furthermore, because of the limited
factual circumstances under which front pay is awarded, it will not un-
dermine the conciliation process mandated by the ADEA.
A worker who is wrongfully discharged because of age faces a job mar-
ket in which it will be very difficult for him to regain his former salary
and status. If such a worker cannot be reinstated, only front pay can
fulfill the purposes of the ADEA.
Peter Janovsky
of the Act for the nonmonetary effects of age discrimination on discharged workers. For
example, Senator Young noted that "it is a particular tragedy to amputate a human be-
ing's functions, to strip productive persons of their skills, cheating them of the dignity of
continued self-support." 113 Cong. Rec. 31,256 (1967). Representative Eilberg noted that
"employment plays a very important role in the makeup of the modern American and
this role cannot be measured in the dollars he carries home on payday. Self-esteem, self-
satisfaction and personal security are important by-products of employment in industrial
America." 113 Cong. Rec. 34,745 (1967)
213. Front pay is the monetary equivalent of the equitable remedy of reinstatement.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text. As an equitable remedy, reinstatement should
be defined broadly to include restoration of salary, status and job satisfaction. An award
that required an employee to work at a job with lower status and satisfaction in order to
regain his former salary is not a true replacement of the equitable remedy of reinstate-
ment. See supra notes 201-13 and accompanying text.
214. An additional way in which front pay may further the purposes of the Act is by
encouraging employers to increase "out-placement services," which are programs to as-
sist workers displaced by reductions in force in obtaining new employment. An employee
who wins an ADEA claim but who has been successfully placed in a new position will be
entitled to little or no front pay from his former employer. See Front Pay Remedy, supra
note 45, at 5. The availability of the front pay remedy therefore would further effectuate
the Act's central purpose of encouraging the continued employment of older workers.
See supra notes 4, 31-32 and accompanying text.
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